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BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
CASS R. SUNSTEIN'
The precautionary principle has been highly influential in legal systems all
over the world. In its strongest and most distinctive forms, the principle im-
poses a burden of proof on those who create potential risks, and it requires regu-
lation of activities even if it cannot be shown that those activities are likely to
produce significant harms. Taken in this strong form, the precautionary prin-
ciple should be rejected, not because it leads in bad directions, but because it
leads in no direction at all. The principle is literally paralyzing-forbidding
inaction, stringent regulation, and everything in between. The reason is that
in the relevant cases, every step, including inaction, creates a risk to health, the
environment, or both. This point raises a further puzzle: Why is the precau-
tionary principle widely seen to offer real guidance? The answer lies in identi-
fiable cognitive mechanisms emphasized by behavioral economists. In many
cases, loss aversion plays a large role, accompanied by a false belief that nature
is benign. Sometimes the availability heuristic is at work. Probability neglect
plays a role as well. Most often, those who use the precautionary principle fall
victim to what might be called "system neglect," which involves a failure to at-
tend to the systemic effects of regulation. Examples are given from numerous
areas, involving arsenic regulation, global warming and the Kyoto Protocol,
nuclear power, pharmaceutical regulation, cloning, pesticide regulation, and
genetic modification offood. The salutary moral and political goals of the pre-
cautionary principle should be promoted through other, more effective methods.
INTRODUCTION
All over the world, there is increasing interest in a simple idea for
the regulation of risk: In case of doubt, follow the precautionary princi-
ple.' Avoid steps that will create a risk of harm. Until safety is estab-
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lished, be cautious; do not require unambiguous evidence. In a
catchphrase: better safe than sorry. In ordinary life, pleas of this kind
seem quite sensible, indeed a part of ordinary human rationality.
People buy smoke alarms and insurance. They wear seat belts and
motorcycle helmets, even if they are unlikely to be involved in an ac-
cident. Shouldn't the same approach be followed by rational regula-
tors as well? Many people believe so.'
A. Problems with Precautions
I aim to challenge the precautionary principle here, not because it
leads in bad directions, but because, read for all that it is worth, it
leads in no direction at all. The principle threatens to be paralyzing,
forbidding regulation, inaction, and every step in between.3 To ex-
plain this problem very briefly, the precautionary principle provides
help only if we blind ourselves to many aspects of risk-related situa-
tions and focus on a narrow subset of what is at stake.4 A significant
part of my discussion will be devoted to showing why this is so. I will
also urge that the precautionary principle gives the (false) appearance
of being workable only because of identifiable cognitive mechanisms,
which lead people to have a narrow rather than wide viewscreen.
With that narrow viewscreen, it is possible to ignore, or to neglect,
some of the risks that are actually at stake. I emphasize that we have
good reason to endorse the goals that motivate many people to en-
dorse the precautionary principle. These goals include the impor-
tance of protecting health and the environment even from remote
risks, the need to attend to unintended adverse effects of technologi-
cal change, and the need to ensure that wealthy countries pay their
fair share for environmental improvement and risk reduction. But
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel A. Tickner eds., 1999)
[hereinafter IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE]. A valuable discussion of
problems with the precautionary principle in Europe is Giandomenico Majone, What
Price Safety? The Precautionary Principle and Its Policy hnplications, 40 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 89 (2002).
2 See the account of widespread international support infra Part I.
3 For criticisms that also emphasize the range of risks at stake, see INDUR M.
GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RISK ASSESSMENT (2001);Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multirisk World, in HUMAN
AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1509 (DennisJ. Paustenbach ed., 2002).
4 For a discussion of the possibly perverse effects of the precautionary principle,
see Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 851 (1996). 1 think that much of what Cross says is convincing, but my emphasis
here is quite different; I stress the cognitive foundations of the principle and urge not
that the principle leads in perverse directions, but that it offers no guidance at all.
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the precautionary principle is a crude way of protecting these goals,
which should be pursued directly. I do not attempt to develop any
particular replacement for the precautionary principle, but I do argue
on behalf of wide viewscreens in the regulation of risks.
In making these claims, I will be challenging an idea that is fast
becoming a staple of regulatory policy.5 Indeed, it has been claimed
that the precautionary principle has become, or at least is becoming, a
binding part of customary international law. 6 In the mid-1970s, Ger-
man environmental policy was founded on the basis of Vorsorgeprinzip,S • 7
a precursor of the precautionary principle. With respect to risks,
German policy has been described as seeing "precaution" as a highly
interventionist idea, one that embodies "a loose and open-ended in-
terpretation of precaution."" In the United States, without using the
term explicitly, Congress has built a notion of precaution into some
important statutes, allowing or requiring regulation on the basis of
conservative assumptions. The precautionary principle has played a
I For helpful discussions of the evolution of the precautionary principle, see David
Freestone & Ellen Hey, Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle, in THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF
IMPLEMENTArION 3 (Int'l Envd. Law & Policy Series No. 31, David Freestone & Ellen
Hey eds., 1996); Wiener, supra note 3.
e See Owen McIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of
Customary International Law, 9J. ENVTL. L. 221, 235 (1997) ("Opinion remains divided
as to whether the precautionary principle may have crystallised into a binding norm of
customary international law. However, the prevalence of the principle in recent envi-
ronmental treaties, declarations and resolutions ... suggests that it may indeed have
attained this status."). See generally ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Int'l Envtl. Law & Policy Series
No. 62, 2002) (representing the precautionary principle as part of the basic founda-
tion of international environmental law throughout the past decade).
Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in RETHINKING RISK AND TI-E
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1, 1 (Julian Morris ed., 2000).
8 Timothy O'Riordan & James Cameron, The History and Contemporary Significance
of the Precautionary Principle, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra
note 1, at 12, 17.
9 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1) (2000) ("National primary
ambient air quality standards.., shall be ambient air quality standards the attainment
and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator,... allowing an ade-
quate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health."); see also Am. Truck-
ing Ass'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("EPA must err on the side of
caution, just as it did here-setting the [air quality standards] at whatever level it
deems necessary and sufficient to protect the public health with an adequate margin of
safety .... ); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Con-
gress directed the Administrator to err on the side of caution .... We see no reason
why this court should ... requir[e] the Administrator to show that there is a medical
consensus that the effects on which the lead standards were based are 'clearly harmful to
health."').
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significant role in international documents, to the point where it has
become ubiquitous. Variations on the notion can be found in at least
fourteen international documents.' ° In 1982, the United Nations
World Charter for Nature apparently gave the first international rec-
ognition to the principle, suggesting that when "potential adverse ef-
fects are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed.""
The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development asserts: "In
order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall
be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scien-
tific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."'"
The widely publicized Wingspread Declaration, from a meeting of
environmentalists in 1998, goes further still: "When an activity raises
threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary
measures should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships
are not established scientifically. In this context the proponent of the
activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof."'
3
10 GOKLANY, supra note 3, at 3. Indeed, there appears to be a cascade effect here,
leading to many casual uses of the precautionary principle, to the point where a failure
to incorporate the principle would seem to be a radical statement. Simply because the
precautionary principle has been used so often, those involved in international agree-
ments are likely to believe that it is probably sensible to use it yet again. And because
so many people identify the precautionary principle with a serious commitment to en-
vironmental protection, see, e.g., AndrewJordan & Timothy O'Riordan, The Precaution-
ay Principle in Contemporary Environmental Policy and Politics, in IMPLEMENTING THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 15, 23 ("At [the precautionary principle's]
core lies the intuitively simple idea that decision makers should act in advance of scien-
tific certainty to protect the environment (and with it, the well-being of future genera-
tions) from incurring harm."), any nation that rejects the principle risks incurring in-
ternational opprobrium. For a general treatment of informational cascades, in which
decisions by others convey information about what it makes sense to do, see David
Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades,
in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188, 188-98 (Mariano Tommasi & Kath-
ryn lerulli eds., 1995); on reputational pressures, see TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS,
PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 26-30 (1995).
11 World Charter far Nature, G.A. Res. 7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Annex, Agenda
Item 21, at5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (1982).
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environ-
ment and Development, Annex 1, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 (1992)
[hereinafter Rio Declaration], reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879.
13 Lessons from Wingspread, in IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra
note 1, app. A, at 353-54 (quoting the Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Princi-
ple); see also To Foresee and to Forestall, in IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE,
supra note 1, at 1, 7-9 (discussing the history of the Wingspread Conference on Imple-
menting the Precautionary Principle). The Wingspread Declaration was issued by a
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The European Union treaty states that EU policy on the environment
"shall be based on the precautionary principle.' ' 4 In February 2000,
the precautionary principle was explicitly adopted by the European
Commission, together with implementing guidelines." Notwithstand-
ing official American ambivalence about the principle, 16 there are
unmistakable echoes of the principle in American environmental
law. 7 The precautionary principle has received a high-profile en-
dorsement in the New York Times Magazine, which listed the principle
as one of the most important ideas of 2001.'
In many ways the precautionary principle seems quite sensible,
even appealing. 9 To justify regulation, a certainty of harm should not
be required; a risk, even a low one, may well be enough. It makes
sense to expend resources to prevent a small chance of disaster-con-
sider the high costs, pecuniary and otherwise, that are spent to reduce
the risk of terrorist attacks. On reasonable assumptions, these costs
are worth incurring even if the probability of harm, in individual cases
or even in the aggregate, is relatively low. The precautionary princi-
ple might well be seen as a plea for a kind of regulatory insurance.
Certainly the principle might do some real-world good, spurring gov-
group of international scientists, government officials, lawyers, labor activists, and
grass-roots environmental activists following a meeting at Wingspread in Racine, Wis-
consin to discuss the precautionary principle. Peter Montague, The Precautionary Prin-
ciple, RACHEL'S ENV'T & HEALTH WKLY., Feb. 19, 1998, at 1, 1, available at http://
www.monitor.net/rachel/r586.html.
14 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 174, OJ.
(C 340) 3 (1997).
15 Press Release, European Commission, Commission Adopts Communication on
Precautionary Principle (Feb. 2, 2000), http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_
consumer/library/press/press38_en.html.
16 See Wiener, supra note 3, at 1510 (noting that although a "precautionary prefer-
ence" is mentioned in some legislation, "the United States has not officially adopted
the Precautionary Principle as a general basis for regulation"); John D. Graham, The
Role of Precaution in Risk Assessment and Management: An American's View, Re-
marks at the Conference on a Comparative Case Study Analysis of the Management of
Risk in a Complex World (Jan. 11-12, 2002), at http://www.useu.be/
RiskManagement/JanllO2GrahamUSRiskManagementPrecPrin.html ("[T]he U.S.
government supports precautionary approaches to risk management but we do not
recognize any universal precautionary principle. We consider it to be... mythical...
like a unicorn.").
17 See the reference to an "adequate margin of safety" in section 109 of the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1) (2000).
18 The Year in Ideas: A to Z, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 92.
19 For a valuable and informative collection, see THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN
THE 20Ti-! CENTURY (Poul Harremoes et al. eds., 2002). This volume provides a num-
ber of case studies in which government responded too slowly to real risks, including
those associated with asbestos, DES, sulfur dioxide, and MTBE in gasoline.
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ernments to attend to neglected problems. Nonetheless, I will be urg-
ing that the principle cannot be fully defended in these ways, simply
because risks are on all sides of social situations. Any effort to be uni-
versally precautionary will be paralyzing, forbidding every imaginable
step, including no step at all.
B. Precautions and Rationality
But if the precautionary principle, taken in a strong form, is un-
helpful, in a way literally senseless, how can we account for its ex-
traordinary influence, and indeed for the widespread belief that it can
and should guide regulatory judgments? I have mentioned its possi-
ble pragmatic value. And undoubtedly the principle is invoked strate-
gically by self-interested political actors; European farmers, for exam-
ple, invoke the idea of precaution to stifle American competitors, who
20
are far more likely to rely on genetically modified crops. But apart
from this point, I suggest that an understanding of human rationality
and cognition provides five useful clues.
1. Loss Aversion
The precautionary principle often seems appealing because of loss
aversion. The central point here is that people dislike losses far more
than they like corresponding gains.2 ' The result is that out-of-pocket
costs, or deterioration from the status quo, seem much worse than
opportunity costs, or benefits lost as a result of continuing the status
quo. In the context of risks, people tend to focus on the losses that
are associated with some activity or hazard and to disregard the gains
that might be associated with that activity or hazard. The precaution-
ary principle often becomes operational only because of loss aversion,
as people take precautions against potential losses from the status
quo, but neglect potential benefits that would be unmistakable gains.
20 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 745-46 (1999) ("In Britain, vandalism against genetic testing sites
has become so common that the government is trying to conceal their locations. In
sharp contrast, American consumers are for the time being fairly relaxed about genetic
engineering, perhaps because most are unaware of how common this alteration pro-
cedure has become.").
21 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRIcA 263, 279 (1979) ("The aggravation that one experiences
in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gain-
ing the same amount." (citation omitted)), reprinted in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES
17, 33 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
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A closely related point is that unfamiliar risks produce far more con-
cern than familiar ones, even if the latter are statistically larger; and
the precautionary principle, in practice, is much affected by this fact.
2. The Myth of a Benevolent Nature
Loss aversion is often accompanied by a mistaken belief that na-
ture is essentially benign,22 leading people to think that safety and
health are generally at risk only or mostly as a result of human inter-
vention. A belief in the relative safety of nature and the relative risk of
new technologies often informs the precautionary principle.
3. The Availability Heuristic
It is well known that people focus on some risks simply because
they are cognitively "available," whereas other risks are not.23 When
the precautionary principle seems to require stringent controls on
one risk, even though other risks are in the vicinity, the availability
heuristic is a common reason. And when the availability heuristic is at
work, certain hazards will stand out, whether or not they are statisti-
cally large.2' The hazards associated with heat waves, for example, re-
ceive little public attention, while the hazards associated with air travel
25
are a significant source of public concern. One reason for this is that
the latter hazards come readily to mind.
22 See JAMES P. COLLMAN, NATURALLY DANGEROUS 29-33 (2001) (explaining that
despite the popular misconception that what is natural is safe, natural substances can
be dangerous to human health).
23 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE (n.s.) 1124, 1127 (1974) ("There are situations in which people
assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which in-
stances or occurrences can be brought to mind."), reprinted in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
24 See Paul Slovic et al., Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking, in COGNITION
AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 165, 174-75 (John S. Carroll & John W. Payne eds., 1976) (stat-
ing that "[t]he most important public hazards are events with extremely low probabili-
ties and extremely great consequences," such as major floods, earthquakes, mudflows,
and serious radiation release from a nuclear power reactor), reprinted in PAUL SLOVIC,
THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 32, 41 (2000).
25 See ERIC KLINENBERG, HEAT WAVE: A SOCIAL AUTOPSY OF DISASTER IN CHICAGO
10 (2002) (comparing coverage of the crash of TWA Flight 800 with the Chicago heat
wave of 1995).
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4. Probability Neglect
People are sometimes prone to neglect the probability that a bad
outcome will occur; they focus instead on the outcome itselfI The
precautionary principle often embodies a form of probability neglect.
At least it does so when people invoke the principle to favor stringent
controls on a low-probability risk, even though the consequence of
those very controls is to give rise to new risks of equal or greater prob-
ability. 7
5. System Neglect
The precautionary principle often reflects a general neglect of the
systemic effects of regulation 8 When a single problem is placed in
view, it can be difficult to see the full consequences of legal interven-
tions. Sometimes the precautionary principle has the appearance of
being workable only because a subset of the relevant effects are "on-
screen"-and, as a result, there seems to be no need to take precau-
tions against other possible adverse effects, also involving health and
safety, that do not register. An important aspect of system neglect is
tradeoff neglect, one source of the conflict between experts and ordinary
people in thinking about risks. ' When experts disagree With ordinary
people about risks, it is sometimes because experts look at both the
benefits and the harms associated with the relevant practice, whereas
ordinary people are paying attention to the harms but not the bene-
fits.30 I suggest that the precautionary principle seems appealing, to
ordinary people, in large part for the same reason.
26 See Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks:
On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 188 (2001) (describing an ex-
periment in which participants framed their decisions around two possible outcomes-
a painful electric shock or a monetary penalty in lieu of the shock-rather than the
probability of each occurring).
In some cases, this is a reasonable reading of the evidence governing genetically
modified food. See ALAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORA'S PICNIC BASKET: THE POTENTIAL
AND HAZARDS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 230-42 (2000) (noting that consumers
who consume organic food in an attempt to avoid the perceived dangers of genetically
modified food may be putting themselves at a greater risk).
28 See DIETRICH D6RNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE 1-47 (1996) (describing the char-
acteristics of regulation that bring about a system's failure).
29 The conflict is treated in Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE (n.s.) 280
(1987), reprinted in SLOVIC, supra note 24, at 220.
30 See HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK 99-119 (1996) (discussing the dif-
ferences between expert and lay assessments of risk).
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One of my major goals is to show that the precautionary principle
can be made workable only through routes of this kind. An under-
standing of behavioral economics simultaneously sheds light on the
operation of the principle, explains its otherwise puzzling appeal, and
suggests why it should be abandoned or at least substantially recast.
Indeed, behavioral economics provides a better understanding of the
uses and pitfalls of the old adage, "better safe than sorry," which is
subject to many of the same objections as the precautionary principle.
I do not attempt to identify a competing principle for adoption by
sensible regulators. But I do urge that such regulators should use a
wide rather than narrow viewscreen-and that, as applied, the precau-
tionary principle is defective precisely because it runs afoul of this
idea. To be sure, many of those who endorse the principle seek to
protect against neglect of the future, disregard of the interests of
those suffering from the greatest deprivation, and impossible de-
mands for unambiguous evidence from regulators. But as we shall
see, the precautionary principle is a crude and sometimes perverse
way of promoting these goals, which can be obtained through other,
better routes. A major purpose of this Article is to suggest the need to
use more direct, effective strategies to pursue the salutary goals of risk
regulation.
This Article comes in four parts. Part I briefly traces the nature
and the appeal of the precautionary principle. Part II explains why
the principle is paralyzing, with particular reference to the issues
raised by arsenic, global warming, nuclear power, and genetic engi-
neering of food. Part III suggests that the apparent sense of the prin-
ciple is best understood in light of the behavioral points just men-
tioned. Part IV is a brief conclusion, in the form of a plea for wider
viewscreens.
I. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: DEFINITION AND APPEAL
I have said that the precautionary principle enjoys widespread in-
ternational support.1 But what does the principle mean or require?
There are numerous definitions, and they are not compatible with
one another. We can imagine a continuum of understandings. At
31 On this point, see sources cited supra note 6.
32 See Morris, supra note 7, at 1-19 (distinguishing the two broad classes of defini-
tions of the precautionary principle: the strong precautionary principle and the weak
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one extreme are weak versions to which no reasonable person could
object; at the other extreme are strong versions that would appear to
call for a fundamental rethinking of regulatory policy.
The most cautious and weak versions suggest, quite sensibly, that a
lack of decisive evidence of harm should not be grounds for refusing
to regulate. Regulation might be justified even if we cannot establish
a definite connection between, for example, low-level exposures to
certain carcinogens and adverse effects on human health. In particu-
lar, regulation might be urged, in such cases, if its costs are relatively
low. Thus, the 1992 Rio Declaration sensibly states that "[w]here there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific cer-
tainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective meas-
ures to prevent environmental degradation. 3 The Ministerial Decla-
ration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of
the North Sea, held in London in 1987, states in the same vein: "Ac-
cepting that in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging
effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is
necessary which may require action to control inputs of such sub-
stances even before a causal link has been established by absolutely
clear scientific evidence. 34 Similarly, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change offers cautious language:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing...
[regulatory] measures, taking into account that policies and measures to
deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global
benefits at the lowest possible cost.35
The Wingspread Declaration goes further: "When an activity raises
threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary
measures should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships
are not fully established scientifically. In this context the proponent
of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of
precautionary principle); Wiener, supra note 3, at 1513 (recognizing that there is no
single definition for the precautionary principle and that existing definitions are "var-
ied" and "often vague").
33 Rio Declaration, supra note 12, at Annex I, princ. 15.
34 Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea: Ministe-
rial Declaration Calling for Reduction of Pollution, Nov. 25, 1987, art. VII, 27 I.L.M.
835, 838 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
35 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 3, princ. 3,
S. TREATY DOc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 108.
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proof.,36 The first sentence just quoted is a mildly more aggressive
version of the statement from the Rio Declaration; it is more aggressive
because it is not limited to threats of serious or irreversible damage.
But in reversing the burden of proof, the second sentence goes fur-
ther still.31 Of course, everything depends on what those with the
burden of proof must show in particular.
In Europe, the precautionary principle is sometimes understood
in an even stronger way, suggesting that it is important to build "a
margin of safety into all decision making.""' According to one defini-
tion, the precautionary principle means "that action should be taken
to correct a problem as soon as there is evidence that harm may oc-
cur, not after the harm has already occurred."3 9  In a comparably
strong version, it is said that
the precautionary principle mandates that when there is a risk of signifi-
cant health or environmental damage to others or to future generations,
and when there is scientific uncertainty as to the nature of that damage
or the likelihood of the risk, then decisions should be made so as to pre-
vent such activities from being conducted unless and until scientific evi-
40dence shows that the damage will not occur.
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, adopted in 2000, appears to adopt a strong version as well."
The Final Declaration of the First European Seas at Risk Conference
says that if "the 'worst case scenario' for a certain activity is serious
36 IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 1, at 353-54 (quoting
the Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle).
37 See David W. Pearce, The Preconditions for Achieving Consensus in the Context of
Technological Risk, in TECHNOLOGICAL RISK: ITS PERCEPTION AND HANDLING IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 57, 62 (Meinolf Dierkes et al. eds., 1980) (suggesting that the
public be presented with "access to information or expertise" from both sides of the
debate so that "[i]nquiry procedures... remain adversarial"); Wiener, supra note 3, at
1515-18 (recognizing some dangers of shifting the burden of proof, such as overregu-
lation, but at the same time endorsing the idea since the proponent of the activity is
best able to generate the information that will be used in making the decisions).
38 Thomas Lundmark, Principles and Instruments of German Environmental Law, 4 J.
ENVrL. L. & PRAC. 43, 44 (1997).
s9 Paul McFedries, Precautionary Principle, WORD SPY, Jan. 23, 2002, at http://
www.wordspy.com/words/precautionaryprinciple.asp.
Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony Concerning the Cloning of Humans and Genetic Modifi-
cations Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Serus., S. Appropriations Comm.,
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the
Earth), LEXIS, CNGTST File [hereinafter Statement of Dr. Brent Blackwelder].
41 See GOKLANY, supra note 3, at 6 (discussing the Convention's application of the
precautionary principle to biological diversity decision making).
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enough then even a small amount of doubt as to the safety of that ac-
tivity is sufficient to stop it taking place.
4
1
Professor Richard Stewart usefully distinguishes among four dif-
ferent versions of the precautionary principle, capturing both weak
and strong types:43
1. Nonpreclusion Precautionary Principle. Regulation should not be
precluded by the absence of scientific uncertainty about activities that
pose a risk of substantial harm.
2. Margin of Safety Precautionary Principle. Regulation should in-
clude a margin of safety, limiting activities below the level at which ad-
verse effects have not been found or predicted.
3. Best Available Technology Precautionary Principle. Best available
technology requirements should be imposed on activities that pose an
uncertain potential to create substantial harm, unless those in favor of
those activities can show that they present no appreciable risk.
4. Prohibitory Precautionary Principle. Prohibitions should be im-
posed on activities that have an uncertain potential to impose substan-
tial harm, unless those in favor of those activities can show that they
present no appreciable risk.
This account shows that the precautionary principle might be de-
scribed both in terms of the level of uncertainty that triggers a regula-
tory response and in terms of the tool that will be chosen in the face of
uncertainty (as in the case of technological requirements or prohibi-
tions). With an appreciation of this point, we can easily imagine many
other variations on these themes. For example, an Information Disclo-
sure Precautionary Principle might say that in the face of uncertainty,
those who subject people to potential risks must disclose relevant in-
formation to those so subjected. The debate over labeling genetically
modified organisms can be seen as a debate over this form of the pre-
cautionary principle.44  An Economic Incentive Precautionary Principle
42 Proceedings of the First European Seas at Risk Conference, N. SEA MONITOR (Seas at
Risk, Copenhagen, Den.), Apr. 1995, Annex I, at 60, quoted in Richard B. Stewart, Envi-
ronmental Regulatory Decision Making Under Uncertainty, in 20 RESEARCH IN LAW AND
ECONOMics 71, 78 (Timothy Swanson ed., 2002).
43 Stewart, supra note 42, at 76.
44 See MCHUGUIEN, supra note 27, at 201-29 (describing the problems associated
with the current system of labeling genetically modified foods, such as the fact that it
leads to indiscriminate, blanket labeling of all genetically modified foods, defeating its
own purpose of informing consumers of the risks of the specific product). California's
Proposition 65, codified in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 1999), re-
quires disclosure of exposure to carcinogens and reproductive toxins and can be un-
derstood as reflecting an Information Disclosure Precautionary Principle. See ROBERT
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might say that, in the face of doubt, economic incentives should be
used to reduce potential risks. For every regulatory tool,45 there is a
corresponding precautionary principle, with possible matches or
mismatches between the problem that calls for the precautions and
the chosen tool. 46 The idea of "margin of safety" can itself be under-
stood in multiple different ways, with a continuum from a small mar-
gin designed to counteract likely risks, to a large one designed to pre-
vent worst cases. As we shall see, multiple margins of safety threaten
to increase other social risks, as by leading people to switch to more
dangerous products.
The official account in Europe is very much in favor of one or an-
other version of the precautionary principle, with the European
Commission having formally adopted it.47 But European practice is
far more complex, with the precautionary principle being invoked
against some risks but not against others." To take just one example,
"Europe has been more precautionary about hormones in beef, while
the US has been more precautionary about mad cow disease (BSE) in
beef and blood donations. "'9 While European nations have taken a
highly precautionary approach to genetically modified foods,5° the
United States has been especially willing to control the risks associated
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 520-30 (3d
ed. 2000) (describing Proposition 65 as a burden-shifting approach to the disclosure of
information).
45 For discussions of regulatory tools, see STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM 36-183 (1982); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISKAND REASON 251-88 (2002).
46 On mismatch, see BREYER, supra note 45, at 191-96.
47 Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle,
COM(00)] final, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/healthconsumer/
library/pub/pubO7-en.pdf.
48 On this complexity, see the illuminating discussion in Jonathan B. Wiener &
Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the United States and Europe, 5 J. RISK RES.
317 (2002).
49 Id. at 323.
50 See Tony Gilland, Precaution, GM Crops and Farmland Birds, in RETHINKING RISK
AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 7, at 60, 60-63 (hypothesizing that the
United Kingdom's more cautious approach to genetically modified crops is due to the
large percentage of total land that is farmed); see also David Vogel & Diahanna Lynch,
Council on Foreign Relations, The Regulation of GMOs in Europe and the United States: A
Case-Study of Contemporary European Regulatory Politics (2001), at http://www.cfr.org/
publication.php?id=3937 (arguing that European regulatory agencies, including those
that govern genetically modified organisms, are taking fewer risks than they were in
the 1960s); Symposium at the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Are the US
and Europe Heading for a Food Fight over Genetically Modified Food? (Oct. 24, 2001)
(transcript available at http://pewagbiotech.org/events/1024) (acknowledging the
divide between American and European attitudes toward genetically modified organ-
isms and providing multiple possible reasons for it).
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with carcinogens in food additives. 5 1 In the context of occupational
risk, American law is far more precautionary than, for example, Swed-
ish law.5' The United States seems highly precautionary about terror-
ism and cigarette smoking, but less so about gun violence and obesity.
I cannot venture a survey here, but it is reasonable to speculate that,
in actual practice, nations cannot plausibly be ranked along some con-
tinuum of precaution. More plausibly, some nations are precaution-
ary about some risks but not others, and a general adoption of the
precautionary principle will conceal this inevitable fact: I will return
to this point and to its inevitability below,54 because it is closely con-
nected to my central claims here. Nonetheless, the mounting impor-
tance of the principle in Europe deserves close attention, if only be-
cause the idea of precaution is playing such a large role in public
debates.
I have suggested that the weak versions of the precautionary prin-
ciple are unobjectionable and important. Every day, people take steps
(and incur costs) to avoid hazards that are far from certain. We do
not walk in moderately dangerous areas at night; we exercise; we buy
smoke detectors; we buckle our seatbelts; we might even avoid fatty
foods. Sensible governments are willing to consider regulation of
risks that, in individual cases or even in the aggregate, have well under
a one hundred percent chance of coming to fruition. This is true for
terrorist threats, environmental hazards, and much more. The weak
versions of the precautionary principle state a truism, one that is un-
controversial and necessary only to combat public confusion or the
self-interested claims of private groups demanding unambiguous evi-
dence of harm, which no rational society requires. This function
should not be trivialized. Nearly one-fifth of Americans, for example,
recently agreed with the implausible suggestion that "[u]ntil we are
sure that global warming is really a problem, we should not take any
51 See Richard Merrill, FDA's Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Rpudiation of Con-
gressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 9-12
(1988) (discussing the FDA's interpretation of the Delaney Clause, which banned car-
cinogens from being added to food if they posed a greater than one-in-one-million risk
to humans).
52 See STEVEN KELMAN, REGULATING AMERICA, REGULATING SWEDEN: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLIcY 221 (1981) (con-
cluding that during the 1960s and 1970s, American occupational regulations were
stricter than those in Sweden).
3 See Wiener & Rogers, supra note 48, at 342 (concluding that no blanket state-
ment summarizes the precautionary policies of both the United States and the Euro-
pean Union, and that they must be looked at individually).
54 lnfra Part I I.A.
BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
steps that would have economic costs. "55 Sometimes people do seem
to seek certainty before showing a willingness to expend costs, and
well-organized private groups like to exploit this fact. Insofar as the
precautionary principle counteracts the tendency to demand cer-
tainty, it should be approved.
Consider in this regard the complex and generally quite sensible
communication on the precautionary principle from the European
Commission.5" The communication urges that the principle "should
be considered within a structured approach to the analysis of risk"
that includes "risk assessment, risk management, [and] risk communi-
cation. 5 7 Hence, measures based on the principle should not be
blindly precautionary, but should be nondiscriminatory in application
and consistent with similar measures previously taken."' More impor-
tant, precautionary steps should be proportional to the chosen level of
protection and "based on an examination of the potential benefits and costs
of action or lack of action (including, where appropriate and feasible,
an economic cost/benefit analysis)."'' The idea of proportional re-
sponse is a recognition of the fact that risk "can rarely be reduced to
zero." The cost-benefit analysis sensibly recognizes the relevance of
"non-economic considerations," including public acceptability, and
somewhat less sensibly urges "that the protection of health takes
precedence over economic considerations."' The Commission also
emphasizes the importance of a "scientific evaluation of the potential
55 Americans on the Global Warming Treaty, Program on Int'l Policy Attitudes (Nov. 5,
1998), at http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/GlobalWarming/globwarm-treaty.
html.
56 Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra
note 47.
57 Id. at 3.
58 See id. at 4 (outlining six criteria with which measures based on the precaution-
ary principle should be judged).
59 Id.; see also id. at 19-20 ("A comparison must be made between the most likely
positive or negative consequences of the envisaged action and those of inaction in
terms of the overall cost to the [European] Community .... [R]equirements linked to
the protection of public health should undoubtedly be given greater weight than eco-
nomic considerations.").
60 Id. at 4.
61 Id. at 5. This is somewhat less sensible for two reasons: First, everything de-
pends on degree; a very slight improvement in public health would not justify an
enormous expenditure of money. Second, large expenditures are themselves associ-
ated with adverse health effects, a point elaborated infra text accompanying notes 113-
20.
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adverse effects" when considering whether to act.62 Indeed, recourse
to the precautionary principle is said to presuppose "identification of
potentially negative effects" alongside a "scientific evaluation" that
shows inconclusive or imprecise data.'3 The Commission's communi-
cation leaves many open questions, but insofar as it takes the precau-
tionary principle to call for attention to potentially significant risks
when the costs of control are not excessive or grossly disproportion-
ate, it is entirely sensible.
Because the weak versions are sensible, I will not discuss them
here. For the weak version, a principal current task is to find ways to
match the extent of the evidence with the extent of the response.
Weak evidence of harm, for example, might merely support further
research, whereas somewhat stronger evidence might support public
disclosure of the risk, and still stronger evidence might support regu-
latory controls. More refined calibration of evidence to response
would be an important way to implement the weak version. But for
present purposes, I will understand the principle in a strong way, to
suggest that regulation is required whenever there is a possible risk to
health, safety, or the environment, even if the supporting evidence is
speculative and even if the economic costs of regulation are high. To
avoid palpable absurdity, the idea of "possible risk" will be understood
to require a certain threshold of scientific plausibility. To support
regulation, no one thinks that it is enough if someone, somewhere,
urges that a risk is worth taking seriously. But under the precaution-
ary principle as I shall understand it, the threshold burden is minimal,
and once it is met, there is something like a presumption in favor of
stringent regulatory controls. I believe that this understanding of the
precautionary principle fits with the understandings of many of its
most enthusiastic proponents,'4 and that with relatively modest varia-
tions, this understanding fits with many of the legal formulations as
well. 5
Why might the precautionary principle, understood in this strong
sense, have such widespread appeal? At first glance, the answer is
62 Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra
note 47, at 14.
63 Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted). For an overview and critique, see Majone, supra
note 1, at 106-07.
64 For a compilation of essays supporting this understanding of the precautionary
principle, see IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 1.
65 See Lothar Gndling, The Status in International Law of the Pinciple of Precautionay
Action, 5 INT'LJ. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 23, 26 (1990) (discussing precautionary ac-
tions as a stringent form of environmental policy).
BEYOAD THE PRECA UTIONARY PRINCIPLE
simple, for the principle contains an important truth: sometimes it is
much better to be safe than sorry. We should certainly acknowledge
that a small probability (say, one in 100,000) of a serious harm (say,
100,000 deaths) deserves extremely serious attention. It is worthwhile
to spend a lot of money to eliminate that risk. The fact that a danger
is unlikely to materialize is hardly a decisive objection to regulatory
controls that have a reasonable chance of success. Now an economi-
cally oriented critic might observe that our resources are limited and
that if we spend large amounts of resources on highly speculative
harms, we will not be allocating those resources wisely. In fact, this is
the simplest criticism of the precautionary principle. Unless the
harm would be truly catastrophic, a huge investment makes no sense
for a harm that has a one in one billion chance of occurring. Taken
for all it is worth, the precautionary principle might seem to require
indefensibly huge expenditures, exhausting our budget well before
the menu of options could be consulted thoroughly. If we take costly
steps to address all risks, however improbable they are, we will quickly
impoverish ourselves. On this view, the principle "would make for a
dim future."' s This is no less true for nations than for individuals.
Some version of this argument is surely convincing, but it also
seems to be missing something. How could a dim future possibly be
compelled by the precautionary principle? Wouldn't the principle
require "precaution" against that very future? Perhaps the response
lies in certain facts about human cognitionY In some contexts, regu-
lation is indeed a form of insurance, or a way of placing special locks
on a door. Consider the following choice: Would you rather have
(a) a sure loss of $20; or
(b) a one percent chance of losing $1980?
In terms of expected value, (b), representing a statistical loss of
$19.80, is a bit less bad than (a); but most people would gladly choose
the sure loss of $20.'o People do not like to run a small risk of a large
or catastrophic loss; this is why people buy insurance and take special
66 Cf Graham, supra note 16, at http://www.useu.be/RiskManagement/
JanlIl02GrahamUSRiskManagementPrecPrin.html (cautioning that precaution can
hamper innovation if abused by policymakers).
See BJoRN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTIcAL ENVIRONMENTALIST 349 (2001) (suggest-
ing that precautionary action may mean taking limited resources away from "doing
good in other areas").
68 Morris, supra note 7, at 17.
69 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 21, at 274 (introducing prospect theory as
an alternative model to utility theory in decision making under risk).
70 See id. at 263-67 (showing the desire to avoid low probability catastrophes).
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precautions against serious harms, even in circumstances in which an
analysis of expected value would not justify these steps." If govern-
ment follows the judgments of ordinary people, it will be risk averse in
this sense as well. The willingness to incur sure losses, in preference
to low-probability catastrophes of lower expected value, helps explain
decisions in a variety of domains involving both law and politics, in-
cluding foreign policy.
2
This point about judgment under risk might seem to suggest that
a democratic society, following popular views, will depart from the
predictions of expected utility theory and even embody a form of risk
aversion for low-probability catastrophes.7 3 The result will be to move
regulation in the direction suggested by the precautionary principle.
But prospect theory cannot provide a defense of the principle in its
strong form. I now explain why this is so.
II. WHY THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IS PARALYZING
A. The Problem
The most serious problem with the strong version of the precau-
tionary principle is that it offers no guidance-not that it is wrong, but
that it forbids all courses of action, including inaction. To understand
this point, it will be useful to anchor the discussion in some concrete
problems:
1. One of the most controversial environmental issues faced in
the first year of the Bush administration involved the regulation of ar-
1 4
senic. There is a serious dispute over the precise level of risks posed
by low levels of arsenic in drinking water, but in the "worst case" sce-
71 For a lucid discussion, analyzing frivolous litigation in terms of risk behavior, see
Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 163
(2000).
72 See ROSE MCDERMOITr, RISK-TAKING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: PROSPECT
THEORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 20-35 (1998) (discussing framing effects, their
effect on decision making, and their applications to international politics); Guthrie,
supra note 71, at 187-88 (summarizing why defendants prefer settlement to low-
probability, high-loss litigation).
73 See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for
Risk Regulation, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 760-62 (1990) (positing that, in a majority-rule
society, "citizens are willing to spend relatively too much on low-probability events as
compared to ones of higher probability").
4 SeeRobert K. Musil, Arsenic on Tap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at A18 (urging the
importance of President Bush setting low maximum levels of arsenic in drinking wa-
ter).
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nario, over one hundred lives might be lost each year as a result of the
fifty parts per billion (ppb) standard that the Clinton administration
sought to revise. At the same time, the proposed ten ppb standard
would cost over two hundred million dollars each year, and it is possi-
ble that it would save as few as five lives annually.
7
6
2. Genetic modification of food has become a widespread prac-
7 
78tice. 77 But the risks of that practice are not known with precision.
Some people fear that genetic modification will result in serious eco-
logical harm and large risks to human health. '
3. Scientists are not in full accord about the dangers associated
with global warming,80 but there is general agreement that global
warming is in fact occurring.8 ' It is possible that global warming will
produce, by 2100, a mean temperature increase of 4.5 degrees Cel-
sius, 8 2 that it will result in well over five trillion dollars in annual
monetized costs,8 and that it will also produce a significant number of
deaths from malaria. The Kyoto Protocol would require most indus-
trialized nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to between
ninety-two percent and ninety-four percent of 1990 levels.
8 4
4. Many people fear nuclear power on the grounds that nuclear
power plants raise various health and safety issues, including some
75 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2258 (2002)
(hypothesizing that the number of lives saved may be as many as 112 or as low as five).
76 Id.
77 See MCHUGiIEN, supra note 27, at 1 (noting that genetically modified crops
cover millions of acres and that Americans consume large quantities of genetically
modified food).
78 See id. at 129-35 (discussing how difficult it is to measure risk in this type of situa-
tion).
79 See Gilland, supra note 50, at 60-83 (discussing the United Kingdom's morato-
rium on genetically modified crops in response to pressure from consumers and envi-
ronmental groups and the scientific evidence of environmental risks).
80 See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS &JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC
MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 71 (2000) ("In reviewing current research [on global
warming], it is clear that the results are highly conjectural and that it continues to be
difficult to make solid estimates of the impacts of climate change."); see also LOMBORG,
supra note 67, at 260-320 (outlining the various arguments and experiments in support
of them). Lomborg's own assessments are highly controversial, but it is noteworthy
that a "skeptical" environmentalist takes global warming very seriously.
81 LOMBORG, supra note 67, at 261.
82 Id. at 317; see also NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 80, at 74 (using a benchmark
of 2.5-degrees-Celsius warming).
83 LOMBORG, supra note 67, at 317; see also NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 80, at
163 (finding discounted costs of four trillion dollars).
84 See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 44, at 1141-42 (listing several nations' respective
quantified emission limitation or reduction commitments).
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possibility of catastrophe." But if a nation does not rely on nuclear
power, it might well rely instead on fossil fuels, and in particular on
coal-fired power plants)" Such plants create risks of their own, includ-
ing risks associated with global warming. China, for example, has re-
lied on nuclear energy in part as a way of reducing greenhouse gases
and in part as a way of reducing other air pollution problems.
s7
5. There is a possible conflict between the protection of marine
mammals and military exercises. The United States Navy, for exam-
ple, engages in many such exercises, and it is possible that marine
mammals will be threatened as a result. Military activities in the
oceans might well cause significant harm, but a decision to suspend
those activities, in cases involving potential harm, might also endanger
military preparedness.""
In these cases, what kind of guidance is provided by the precau-
tionary principle? It is tempting to say, as is in fact standard, that the
principle calls for strong controls on arsenic, on genetic engineering
of food, on greenhouse gases, on threats to marine mammals, and on
nuclear power."" In all of these cases, there is a possibility of serious
85 See Robert Goodin, No Moral Nukes, 90 ETHICS 417, 420 (1980) (analyzing the
risks associated with nuclear power).
86 See Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Con-
troversy, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1833, 1835-36 (1978) (comparing the health effects of nu-
clearyower with those of coal).
87See Ling Zhong, Note, Nuclear Energy: China's Aproach Towards Addressing Global
Warming, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 493, 507-08 (2000) (describing how China has
been using nuclear power to reduce various emissions). Of cotrse it is possible, and
even sensible, to urge that nations should reduce reliance on both coal-fired power
plants and nuclear power, and move instead toward environmentally preferred alterna-
tives, such as solar power. For a general discussion of this option, see ALLAN
COLLINSON, FACING THE FUTURE: RENEWABLE ENERGY (1991); RENEWABLE ENERGY:
POWE R FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (Godfrey Boyle ed., 1996); Dan E. Arvizu, Advanced
Energy Technolog and Climate Change Policy Jhnplications, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 435 (2001).
But these alternatives pose problems of their own, involving feasibility and expense.
See LOMBORG, suYna note 67, at 118-48 (discussing energy and nonenergy resources,
including biomass, geothermal energy, wind, solar power, and hydroelectric power,
but noting that each has its own limitations in terms of feasibility and/or expense).
88 See Marine Mammal Protection Act Reauthorization: Hearing on HR. 4781 Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife & Oceans of the Comm. on House Res., 107th
Cong. § 3 (2002) (statement of Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Readiness and Logistics) [hereinafter Statement of Vice Admiral Char-
les W. Moore] (discussing the interplay between the needs of military readiness and
environmental conservation), available at http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/
107cong/fisheries/2002junl 3/moore.htm.
89 For examples of this position, see sources collected in the forty-third INRA Cou-
rier of the Environment, Le Couier de l'environnement de I'INRA, Institut National de la Re-
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harms, and no authoritative scientific evidence suggests that the pos-
sibility is close to zero. If the burden of proof is on the proponent of
the activity or process in question, the precautionary principle would
seem to impose a burden of proof that cannot be met. Put to one side
the question of whether the precautionary principle, understood to
compel stringent regulation in these cases, is sensible. Let us ask a
more fundamental question: Is that more stringent regulation there-
fore compelled by the precautionary principle?
The answer is that it is not. In some of these cases, it should be
easy to see that, in its own way, stringent regulation would actually run
afoul of the precautionary principle. The simplest reason is that such
regulation might well deprive society of significant benefits, and for
that reason produce a large number of deaths that otherwise would
not occur. In some cases, regulation eliminates the "opportunity
benefits" of a process or activity, and thus causes preventable deaths.90
If this is so, regulation is hardly precautionary. The most familiar
cases involve the "drug lag," produced by a highly precautionary ap-
proach to the introduction of new medicines and drugs into the mar-
ket. 91 If a government takes such an approach, it might protect peo-
ple against harms from inadequately tested drugs; but it will also
prevent people from receiving potential benefits from those very
drugs.2  Is it "precautionary" to require extensive premarketing test-
ing, or to do the opposite?
Or consider the case of genetic modification of food. Many peo-
ple believe that a failure to allow genetic modification might well re-
sult in numerous deaths, and a small probability of many more.93 The
reason is that genetic modification holds out the promise of produc-
ing food that is both cheaper and healthier-resulting, for example,
in "golden rice," which might have large benefits in developing coun-
cherche Agronomique (National Institute of Agricultural Research) (May 2001), at
http://www.inra.fr/Internet/Produits/dpenv/som-ec43.html.
90 See AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY 48-50 (1988) (explaining how
attempts to secure safety may actually increase danger).
91 For analysis of the drug lag, see HENRY G. GRABOWSKI &JOHN M. VERNON, THE
REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS 38-41
(1983); John M. Mendeloff, Decision Analysis and FDA Drug Review: A Proposal for
"Shadow" Advisory Committees, 6 RISK 203, 203-14 (1995), available at http://
www.fplc.edu/RISK/vol6/summer/mendelof.htm.
92 For similar discussions regarding energy, see supra note 87.
93 For an informative history, tracing but not endorsing the various objections to
genetic modification, see BILL LAMBRECHT, DINNERAT THE NEW GENE CAFI (2001).
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tries.' Now the point is not that genetic modification will definitely
have those benefits or that the benefits of genetic modification out-
weigh the risks. The point is only that if the precautionary principle is
taken in its strongest form, it is offended by regulation as well as by
nonregulation. So too for regulation of ground-level ozone. Such
regulation does seem justified by the precautionary principle, for re-
sponsible people believe that low levels of ozone produce a range of
health harms, including risks of death.9 But there is also evidence
that ground-level ozone produces health benefits by reducing risks of
cataracts and skin cancer.' Because the precautionary principle calls
for protection when causal connections are unclear, it would appear
to require, with respect to ground-level ozone, both stringent regula-
tion and no regulation at all.
Sometimes regulation would violate the precautionary principle
because it would give rise to substitute risks, in the form of hazards that
materialize, or are increased, as a result of regulation.'" Consider the
case of nuclear power. It is reasonable to think that in light of current
options, a ban on nuclear power will increase dependence on fossil
fuels,"8 which contribute to global warming. If so, such a ban would
seem to run afoul of the precautionary principle. Or consider the
EPA's effort to ban asbestos, :9 a ban that might well seem justified or
even compelled by the precautionary principle. The difficulty, from
the standpoint of that very principle, is that substitutes for asbestos
94 See id. at 294-310 (describing feeding the hungry as the ultimate argument in
favor of genetically modified food and reviewing the Congressional Hunger Center's
briefing on "golden rice" in the summer of 2000).
95 See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 357-59 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (review-
ing the correlation between low levels of ozone and adverse health effects).
96 RANDALL LUYFER & HOWARD GRUENSPECHI', ASSESSING BENEFITS OF GROUND-
LEVEL OZONE: WHAT ROLE FOR SCIENCE IN SETrING NATIONAL AIR QUALITY
STANDARDS? I (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Regulatory Analysis
No. 01-04, 2001), available at http://aei.brookings.org/publications/reganalyses/reg_
analysis 01L04.pdf.
See the discussion of risk-related tradeoffs in RISK VERSUS RISK (John D. Gra-
ham &Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995); SUNSTEIN, supra note 45, at 133-52.
1M See Breyer, supra note 86, at 1840 (suggesting that delays in the process of nu-
clear plant approval will lead to more use of fossil fuels, which also carry environ-
mental dangers).
99 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (5th Cir. 1991) ("In
1989, the EPA issued a final rule [40 C.F.R. pt. 763 (1989)] prohibiting the manufac-
ture, importation, processing, and distribution in commerce of most asbestos-
containing products.").
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also carry risks. 00 Or return to possible risks to marine mammals from
the United States Navy. Some people are concerned that efforts to
eliminate those risks will endanger military preparedness, if only be-
cause of administrative barriers to training exercises."0 In these cir-
cumstances, what is the appropriate approach, according to the pre-
cautionary principle?
The problem is pervasive. The Administrator of the EPA has ex-
pressed concern that arsenic regulation, by virtue of its cost, will lead
people to cease using local water systems and to rely on private wells,
102
which have high levels of contamination. If this is so, stringent ar-
senic regulation violates the precautionary principle no less than less
stringent regulation does. This is a common situation, for opportu-
nity benefits and substitute risks are the rule, not the exception.'03 Or
consider the continuing debate over whether certain antidepressants
impose a (small) risk of breast cancer."'' A precautionary approach
might seem to caution against the use of such antidepressants because
of their carcinogenic potential; but the failure to use those depres-
sants might well impose risks of its own, both psychological and physi-
cal. Or consider the Soviet Union's decision to evacuate and relocate
oo Id. at 1221 ("[M]any of the substitutes that.., will be used in the place of as-
bestos have known carcinogenic effects .... ").
101 See Statement of Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, supra note 88, § 6 (suggesting
that some efforts to protect marine mammals have affected the "ability to deploy mis-
sion-essential equipment and to train realistically for the challenges our country
faces").
102 The Administrator indicated:
[W]e have seen instances, particularly in the West and Midwest, where arsenic
is naturally occurring at up to 700 and more parts per billion, where the cost
of remediation has forced water companies to close, leaving people with no
way to get their water, save dig wells. And then they are getting water that's
even worse than what they were getting through the water company.
Interview by Robert Novak & Al Hunt, Evans, Novak, Hunt & Shields, Cable News Net-
work, with Christine Todd Whitman, Administrator, EPA (Apr. 21, 2001).
103 See, e.g., GoKLANY, supra note 3, at 13-27 (emphasizing the public health risks of
banning DDT in the form of increasing malaria risks in the developing world). Note
an important additional point: some regulation will have ancillary benefits, by reducing
risks other than those that are specifically targeted. For a valuable discussion, see
Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Par-
ity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763 (2002).
104 CompareJudith P. Kelly et al., Risk of Breast Cancer According to Use of Antidepres-
sants, Phenothiazines, and Antihistamines, 150 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 861 (1999) (studying
the relationship of the use of antidepressants, phenothiazines, and antihistamines on
breast cancer rates and finding no overall association), with C.R. Sharpe et al., The E-
fects of Tricyclic Antidepressants on Breast Cancer Risk, 86 BRIT. J. CANCER 92 (2002) (con-
cluding that heavy exposure to antidepressants increases the rate of breast cancer inci-
dence).
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400,000 people in response to the risk of adverse effects from the
Chernobyl fallout.0 5 It is not clear that, on balance, this massive relo-
cation project was justified on health grounds: "A comparison ought
to have been made between the psychological and medical burdens of
this measure (anxiety, psychosomatic diseases, depression, and sui-
cides) and the harm that may have been prevented.' ' 10 6 More gener-
ally, it is possible that a sensible government ignores low levels of ra-
diation, on the grounds that precautionary responses are likely to
cause fear that outweighs any health benefits from those responses.107
Or consider a more general question about how to handle low-
level toxic agents, including carcinogens: Do such agents cause ad-
verse effects? If we lack clear evidence, it might seem "precautionary"
to assume that they do, and hence to assume, in the face of uncer-
tainty, that the dose-response curve is linear and without safe thresh-
olds.' In fact, this is the default assumption of the EPA.'09 But is this
approach' actually precautionary? Some evidence suggests that many
toxic agents that are harmful at high levels are actually beneficial at
low levels."0 Thus, hormesis is a dose-response relationship in which
low doses stimulate desirable effects and high doses inhibit them."'
When hormesis is involved, use of a linear dose-response curve, with-
out safe thresholds, will actually cause mortality and morbidity effects.
105 Bellona Found., Chernobyl-The Accident, at http://www.bellona.no/en/
environmenal-facts-and info/radioactivity-and-nuclearpower/12663.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 22, 2003).
106 Maurice Tubiana, Radiation Risks in Perspective: Radiation-Induced Cancer Among
Cancer Risks, 39 RADIATION & ENV'L. Biopiysics 3, 10 (2000).
107 Id. For some counterevidence, discussing a possible association between cellu-
lar telephones and cancer, see Lennart Hardell et al., Further Aspects on Cellular and
Cordless Phones and Brain Tumours, 22 INT'L.J. ONCOLOGy 399 (2003). For a helpful
general discussion applying the precautionary principle in the context of electromag-
netic radiation, see Leeka I. Kheifets et al., The Precautionary Principle and EMkV Inmple-
mentation and Evaluation, 4J. RiSK RES. 113 (2000).
,08 For criticism of this assumption, see Tubiana, supra note 106, at 8-9.
109 See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 6994 (Jan.
22, 2001) ("After full consideration of public comments, EPA continues to believe that
the most scientifically valid approach, given the lack of critical data, is to use the linear
approach to assessing the mode of action.").
"0 This evidence is outlined in EdwardJ. Calabrese & Linda A. Baldwin, Hormesis:
The Dose-Response Revolution, 43 ANN. REVS. PHARMACOLOGY & ToxicoLoGY 175 (2003)
[hereinafter Calabrese & Baldwin, Hormesis], available at http://pharmtox.
annualreviews.org/cgi/reprint/43/1/175.pdf; Edward J. Calabrese & Linda A.
Baldwin, The Hormetic Dose-Response Model Is More Common than the Threshold Model in
Toxicology, 71 TOXICOLOGICAL Sci. 246 (2003), available at http://toxsci.oupjournals.
org/cgi/reprint/71/2/246.pdf.
Calabrese & Baldwin, Hormesis, supra note 110, at 176-77.
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Which default approach to the dose-response curve is precaution-
ary?1 2 To raise this question is not to take any stand on whether some,
many, or all toxic agents are beneficial or instead harmful at very low
doses; it is only to say that the simultaneous possibility of benefits at
low levels and of harms at low levels makes the precautionary princi-
ple paralyzing.
It is possible to go much further. A great deal of evidence sug-
gests the possibility that an expensive regulation can have adverse ef-
fects on life and health."3 To be sure, both the phenomenon and theS 114
underlying mechanisms are disputed. It has been urged that a sta-
tistical life can be lost for every expenditure of $7.25 million,"1 5 and
one study suggests a cutoff point, for a loss of life per regulatory ex-
penditure, of $15 million. A striking paper suggests that poor peo-
ple are especially vulnerable to this effect-that a regulation that re-
duces wealth for the poorest twenty percent of the population will
have twice as large a mortality effect as a regulation that reduces
wealth for the wealthiest twenty percent."1 7 I do not mean to accept
any particular amount here, or even to suggest that there has been an
unambiguous demonstration of an association between mortality and
regulatory expenditures."l  The only point is that reasonable people
believe in that association. It follows that a multimillion-dollar ex-
penditure for "precaution" has-as a worst case scenario-significant
112 For an interesting discussion of this question, see Frank B. Cross, Legal Implica-
tions of Hormesis, BELLE NEWSL. (Northeast Reg'l Envtl. Pub. Health Ctr., Amherst,
Mass.),.Jan. 2001, at 2, available at http://www.belleonline.com/n292.html.
113 See Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK
ANALYSIS 147, 147 (1990) ("[S]ome expensive regulations and programs intended to
save lives may actually lead to increased fatalities."); Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall
III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Saftty Regulation, 8J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 43, 43 (1994) ("Regulations to promote heath and safety that are excep-
tionally costly relative to the expected health benefits may actually worsen
health .... ),
114 See Lutter & Morrall, supra note 113, at 57-60 (discussing the policy implications
of using a health-health analysis of safety regulation versus a cost-benefit analysis).
Keeney, supra note 113, at 155.
116 ROBERT W. HAI-IN ET AL., Do FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE MORTALITY? 7
(2000).
117 Kenneth S. Chapman & Govind Hariharan, Do Poor People Have a Stronger Rela-
tionship Between Income and Mortality than the Rich? Implications of Panel Data for Health-
Health Analysis, 12J. RISK& UNCERTAINIY 51, 59-60 (1996).
118 Cf Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins, Regulatoiy Review of Environmental Policy:
The Potential Role of Health-Health Analysis, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 111, 118 (1994)
(arguing that adverse health effects from the cost of regulation are possible but un-
likely).
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adverse health effects, with an expenditure of $200 million leading to
perhaps as many as thirty lives lost.
This point makes the precautionary principle hard to implement
not merely where regulation removes "opportunity benefits" or intro-
duces or increases substitute risks, but also in any case in which the
regulation costs a significant amount. If this is so, the precautionary
principle, for that very reason, seems to argue against many regula-
tions. If the precautionary principle draws into doubt any action that
carries a small risk of significant harm, then we should be reluctant to
spend a lot of money to reduce risks, simply because those expendi-
tures themselves carry risks. Here is the sense in which the precau-
tionary principle, taken for all that it is worth, is paralyzing: it stands
as an obstacle to regulation and nonregulation, and to everything in
between.
To say this is not to say that the precautionary principle cannot be
amended in a way that removes the problem."9 But once it is so
amended, it is much less distinctive and increasingly resembles an ef-
fort to weigh the health benefits of regulation against the health
costs,2 or even to measure benefits against costs. I will return to this
point below.
It is now easier to understand the earlier suggestion that despite
their formal enthusiasm for the precautionary principle, European
nations are not "more precautionary" than the United States. Jona-
than Wiener and Michael Rogers have demonstrated this point em-
pirically. 2 1 It would be most valuable to attempt a comparative study,
to see which nations are especially precautionary with respect to spe-
cific risks, and also to explore changes over time. In the modem pe-
riod, for example, the United States has appeared to take a highly
precautionary approach to the risks associated with abandoned haz-
ardous waste dumps, terrorism, and universal health care, but not to
11) For various efforts to amend the precautionary principle, see GOKLANY, supra
note 3, at 89-94; Wiener, supra note 3, at 1513-18.
120 SeeJohn D. Graham &Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK
VERSUS RISK, supra note 97, at 1, 10-11 (discussing the assessment of heath risks and
tradeoffs).
121 See Wiener & Rogers, supra note 48, at 317 (concluding that "neither the
[European Union] nor the [United States] can claim to be categorically 'more precau-
tiona 2 ' than the other").
g SeeJAMEsT. HAMILTON & W. KiP Viscusi, CALCULATING RISKS? 129 (MIT Sloan
Sch. of Mgmt., Regulation of Economic Activity Series No. 21, 1999) (indicating that
"individuals appear to be willing to spend approximately $5 million to save a statistical
life," yet "regulators at Superfund sites appear to make cleanup decisions that imply a
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take a highly precautionary approach to the risks associated with
global warming, indoor air pollution, poverty, and obesity. What I
have been urging is that the selectivity of precautions is not merely an
empirical fact; it is a conceptual inevitability. Simply as a logical mat-
ter, no society can be highly precautionary with respect to all risks.
B. Rejoinders, Adjustments, and Salutary Goals
Is there anything that might be said, at this stage, by proponents
of the precautionary principle? There are several possibilities.
1. The Weak Version and Balancing
It might be tempting to revert to the weak version of the princi-
ple-a version that is entirely unobjectionable. As we have seen, the
version adopted by the European Commission is less troublesome
than the strongest versions. 113 Alternatively, it might be urged that in
many cases in which the principle is invoked, the risk at issue is the
one that deserves the most sustained attention. In the context of
global warming, for example, the precautionary principle might be
triggered on the grounds that the potential risks of warming are far
greater than the risks associated with the reduction of greenhouse
gases. But this step points toward a sensible and substantial refashion-
ing of the principle, one that ensures that low-probability catastrophes
are given careful attention, and that the various risks at issue will be
weighed and balanced in accordance with the facts.
Another kind of sensible balancing is embodied in the notion of
"prudent avoidance," which asks people to take steps that have only
124modest costs. So long as requests for prudent avoidance do not ac-
tivate a great deal of public fear, it makes sense to favor inexpensive
measures that reduce potential risks. If the precautionary principle
merely calls for prudent avoidance, it embodies a form of reasonable
balancing and should not be rejected.
cost per cancer case averted that is often in the hundreds of millions of dollars and
even the billions").
123 See supra text accompanying notes 56-63 (arguing that the Commission's ver-
sion is sensible).
124 Kheifets et al., supra note 107, at 120.
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2. Biases
In addition, advocates of the precautionary principle might urge
that environmental values are systematically disregarded in the regula-
tory process, or not given their due, and hence that the principle
helps counteract systematic biases. 2 5 A particular problem here is
myopia 1: perhaps government officials, uninformed by the precau-
tionary principle, would fail to attend to risks that will not occur, or be
seen to occur, in the short run. Another problem is that people tendto b unraliticaly .. .127
to be unrealistically optiMistic. As a result, many low-level risks do
not register at all. A related problem is that people tend to reduce
cognitive dissonance, sometimes by treating risks as if they are tiny,
even worth ignoring. 12 When people think that they are "safe," even
though they face a statistical risk, they might well be responding to
emotions, seeking to avoid the anxiety that comes from an under-
standing of the inevitability of risk.
On this view, the principle can be defended pragmatically, if not
theoretically, as a way of emphasizing the importance of attending to
issues, especially environmental issues, that might otherwise be ne-
glected. In some settings, the pragmatic defense is undoubtedly plau-
sible, and the precautionary principle, applied with a narrow
viewscreen, undoubtedly leads to some good results. But two prob-
lems remain. The first is that environmental values are sometimes on
both sides of the controversy-consider the nuclear power dispute.
The same is certainly true of health and safety, as shown by the case of
premarket testing of pharmaceuticals. The second is that even when
125 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-
Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1566-87 (1983) (discussing the noncommodity
value of environmental resources and theorizing why governments have difficulty in-
corporating these values into their regulatory schemes).
26 See the treatment of hyperbolic discounting in Christine Jolls et al., A Behav-
ioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1479, 1539-41 (1998); Rich-
ard H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201
(1981), reprinted in RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL. ECONOMICS 127 (1991).
127 See SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS 7 (1989) ("[N]ormal human
thought and perception is marked not by accuracy but by positive self-enhancing illu-
sions about the self, the world, and the future."). Some doubts about the claim of un-
realistic optimism are raised in Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CI-I. L.
REV. (forthcoming May 2003) (reviewing HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002)).
128 See George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cogni-
tive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 309 (1982) (noting that workers employed in a
dangerous field "will try to reject the cognition that the job is dangerous"), reprinted in
GEORGE A. AKERLOF, AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES 123, 126 (1984).
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environmental values are on only one side, the interests and values on
the other side might well be at a comparative disadvantage too-con-
sider the potential beneficiaries of genetic modification of food. In
short, a more modest and revised precautionary principle might well
make sense, but the less modest, and more distinctive, principle is
hard to defend.
3. Distribution
It is also possible to defend the precautionary principle on dis-
tributional grounds. The Clean Air Act takes a precautionary ap-
proach, requiring an "adequate margin of safety" and hence regula-
tion in the face of scientific uncertainty.29  At the same time, the
Clean Air Act appears to give disproportionate benefits to poor peo-
ple and members of minority groups."" Aggressive action to combat
climate change could well be more beneficial to poor countries than
to wealthy ones.13 ' This is partly because wealthy countries are better
able to adapt; partly because agriculture, potentially vulnerable to
climate change, is responsible for a smaller percentage of the econ-
omy of wealthy nations (less than five percent of the GDP in the
United States) 132 than of poor nations;1:i and partly because one of the
most serious health risks posed by climate change consists of an in-
129 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000); see Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355,
380 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("(N]othing in the Clean Air Act requires EPA to wait until it has
perfect information before adopting a protective secondary [national air quality stan-
dard]."). For a qualified defense of the precautionary principle, focused on the possi-
bility that "scientific uncertainty should not disadvantage potential victims," see Mark
Geistfeld, Implementing the Precautionary Principle, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
11,326, 11,333 (Nov. 2001).
10 See Matthew E. Kahn, The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Regulation, REGULATION,
Spring 2001, at 34, 35-37 (claiming that air quality improvements disproportionately
help the poor and that wealthier purchasers of new vehicles are shouldering a dispro-
portionate amount of the financial burden brought about by Clean Air Act regula-
tion).
131 See, e.g., LOMBORG, supra note 67, at 301 (contending that the cost of global
warming will be two to nine times greater in the developing world measured as a per-
centage of the GDP); Joseph E. Aldy et al., Climate Change: An Agenda for Global
Collective Action 7 (October 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that wealthier
countries have more resources and technology to help them adjust to climate
chanes), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/media/stiglitz.pdf.
"2 Global Warming-Impacts: Agriculture, EPA, at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/
globalwarming.nsf/content/impactsagriculture.html (last modified Jan. 29, 2003).
133 See The Regional Impacts of Climate Change, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc,/regional/I56.htm (indicating that
eighteen percent of the GDP of "Middle East and Arid Asia Regions" is derived from
agriculture).
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creased incidence of malaria, a nonproblem for wealthy countries.
In the context of global warming, at least, the precautionary principle
might be invoked to prevent especially severe burdens on those in the
worst position to bear them.
Of course, it makes sense to be concerned with the distribution of
domestic or international risks. The problem of global warming owes
its origin to the actions of wealthy nations, and hence those nations
should bear a disproportionate cost of correction if poor nations are
likely to be hit hardest. The distributional effects of global warming
are among the strongest points in favor of aggressive regulation of
greenhouse gases."' But in many cases, the precautionary principle,
as applied, would threaten to have unfortunate distributional ef-
fects. 136 The case of genetic modification of food is an example; here
the benefits are likely to be enjoyed by poor people, not the wealthy.""
The case of DDT is similar. While a ban on DDT, supported by refer-
ence to the precautionary principle, is eminently justified in wealthy
nations, such a ban is likely to have deleterious effects in at least some
poor countries, where DDT is the cheapest and most effective way of
combating serious diseases-most notably malaria.S Or consider the
following possibility: The precautionary principle might seem to re-
quire stringent limits on aflatoxin, a known carcinogen, coming into
Europe and America from Africa. But European Community stan-
dards are so stringent in this regard that they are projected to prevent
only one death per year in the EU-a small number in the abstract,
and evidently trivial in light of the fact that 33,000 people die annually
from liver cancer in the EU. ' And precaution has its costs, imposing
144 LOMBORG, supra note 67, at 292.
135 Note, however, that if the concern is poor countries, it is not entirely clear that
global warming is the highest priority in light of the many needs of those countries,
needs that might be addressed by wealthier nations. See id. at 322-23 (arguing that di-
rect subsidies from wealthy to poor nations would benefit poor nations more than re-
ductions in greenhouse gas emissions).
II See GOKLANY, supra note 3, at 86 (concluding that a policy of aggressive green-
house gas emission controls would adversely affect developing countries).
1,17 See id. at 55 (arguing that the costs of reducing or banning the use of geneti-
cally motlified crops "would be borne by the poorest and most vulnerable segments of
society"). I am assuming here that poor people will benefit because of the increased
availability of nutritious, low-cost food. This is of course an optimistic and disputable
view about the facts.
1.38 SUNSTEIN, supra note 45, at 14; see AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE?: A
CITIZEN'S GUIDE ro ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES 56 (1995) (explain-
ing that DDT is an inexpensive and highly effective way to kill the mosquitoes that
carty malaria and the agents that spread typhus fever).
S9 Majone, sulrra note 1, at 106.
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significant losses on African farmers, whose ability to export food is
severely compromised by the European Community's requirements.
40
Here, then, is a case in which the precautionary principle has perverse
distributional consequences. Distributional issues should indeed be a
part of a system of risk regulation, but the precautionary principle is a
crude, indirect, and sometimes perverse way of incorporating distribu-
tional concerns.
4. Risk Versus Uncertainty
A more subtle point is possible. Often regulators, and ordinary
people, are acting in a situation not of risk (where probabilities can be
assigned to various outcomes) but of uncertainty (where no such prob-
abilities can be assigned).14 ' Thus far I have been speaking as if envi-
ronmental and other risk-related problems involved a risk of ascer-
tainable probability-so that analysts are able to say that the risk of X
number of deaths is Y percent, whereas the risk of 2X number of
deaths is Y/n, and so forth. But we can imagine instances in which
analysts cannot specify even a range of probability, and in which the
extent of the harm is also not susceptible to even vague probabilistic
prediction. 142
In a situation of uncertainty, when existing knowledge does not
permit regulators to assign probabilities to outcomes, it is standard to
follow the minimax principle: Choose the policy with the best worst-143
case outcome. Perhaps the precautionary principle, as applied, is a
form of the minimax principle, asking officials to identify the worst
case among the various options, and to select that option whose worst
case is least bad. Perhaps the minimax principle would support many
140 See id. ("World Bank economists estimate that the new [aflatoxin] standards
would decrease African exports of cereals, dried fruits and nuts to the EU by 64 per-
cent....").
141 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-20 (1921) (noting
that measurability separates risk from uncertainty); Paul Davidson, Is Probability Theoy
Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post Keynesian Perspective, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at
129, 137 (discussing the distinction between the "probability calculus" and conditions
of uncertainty). The distinction between uncertainty and risk is challenged by Majone,
supra note 1, at 103. On the distinction between risk, uncertainty, and ignorance
(knowing neither probability nor all of the outcomes), see Twelve Late Lessons, in THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY, supra note 19, at 185, 188.
142 See Stewart, supra note 42, at 73 (characterizing these instances as where "the
probability of harm occurring, and/or the magnitude of the harm if it occurs, is not
determinate and is subject to substantial uncertainty").
143 SeeJON ELSTER, EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE 185-207 (1983), for a helpful
discussion of the minimax principle.
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proposed applications of the precautionary principle, by, for example,
urging aggressive steps to combat global warming.
This is not an implausible suggestion; sometimes it is best to re-
spond to the worst-case scenario, as some governments do in the face
of risks to national security (not excluding those risks posed by terror-
ism). But the response faces three problems. The first is that the pre-
cautionary principle is not the minimax principle, and if the latter
principle is what is meant, then we should be discussing that principle
directly and evaluating it against the alternatives. The precautionary
principle obscures these issues. The second problem is that, so de-
fended, the principle might well prevent rational priority setting, sim-
ply because it "leads to a disproportionate allocation of limited regula-
tory resources to those activities posing relatively more uncertainty,
because the worst case assumption inflates their harm value relative to
risks that are better characterized.', 44 The third problem is that risks
that are now in the realm of uncertainty will often move, over time,
into the realm of risk. Indeed, one of the principal goals of a well-
functioning system of environmental protection is to acquire more in-
formation about potential hazards-information that includes an un-
derstanding of the probability of harm. In some circumstances, ac-
quiring information is far better than responding to the worst-case
scenario, at least when that response itself creates dangers in the
realm of both uncertainty and risk. ','
5. Salutary Goals
We are now in a position to appreciate some of the goals of those
who invoke the precautionary principle. Serious environmental prob-
lems might be addressed too late, or not at all, simply because causal
connections cannot be described with certainty. In the context of to-
bacco, for example, a serious public health movement was muted
143simply by virtue of both actual and perceived scientific doubt -even
though reasonable people take steps to reduce likelihoods, not only
144 Stewart, supra note 42, at 97.
14, See id. at 106 (advocating this approach to "help ensure that regulatory deci-
sions are made on the basis of more accurate estimations of costs and benefits, which
will in turn make it more likely that such decisions will enhance social welfare").
146 Cf ROBERT E. GOODIN, NO SMOKING: THE ETiICAL ISSUES 8-15 (1989) (detail-
ing the scientific studies and theories used to show the harm caused by cigarettes and
those used to cast doubt). To some extent, of course, tobacco companies manipulated
and misstated the evidence, but it is also true that, at early stages, the scientific evi-
dence was suggestive rather than conclusive.
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certainties, of adverse effects. The precautionary principle can be
taken as a reminder not to require proof. To the extent that the pre-
cautionary principle is a reminder of obligations to the future, it is en-
tirely salutary. Those who invoke the principle undoubtedly are moti-
vated, much of the time, by the goal of protecting the most vulnerable
people against risks to their safety and health. On this view, the pre-
cautionary principle has strong moral goals, and they are distributive
in character.
Nothing I have said is meant to draw these goals into doubt. My
claim is that the precautionary principle is a crude and sometimes
perverse way of promoting the relevant goals-and that if it is taken
seriously, it is paralyzing and therefore not helpful at all.'47
III. THE OPERATION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A
BEHAVIORAL ACCOUNT
In practice, the precautionary principle is widely thought to pro-. 148
vide concrete guidance. How can this be? I suggest that the princi-
ple becomes operational if and only if those who apply it wear blind-
ers-only, that is, if they focus on some aspects of the regulatory
situation but downplay or disregard others. Consider, for example,
those who think that the precautionary principle requires restrictions
on genetic engineering of food; to have this belief, it is necessary to
ignore the potential health benefits of the practice. Or consider those
147 Of course it is possible that strong regulatory controls will turn out to be "tech-
nology forcing"-that they will promote technological innovation to the benefit of the
environment and public health. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 44, at 604-20 (discuss-
ing technological innovation brought about by national regulation of mobile source
emissions). If the precautionary principle leads to such controls, it might be desirable
for that reason. The problem is that technological innovation might be expensive or
even infeasible, and if this is so, it might produce risks of its own. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the government, concerned about the hazards associated with coal-fired
power plants, required a great deal of technological innovation to reduce those haz-
ards. The resulting regulation might well increase the cost of energy, possibly signifi-
cantly, and increased energy costs create risks of their own. None of this means that
technology forcing is always a bad idea. The problem is that the precautionary princi-
ple, if used to force technological innovation, does not tell ts when and where such
innovation should be required.
148 See, e.g., Ken Geiser, Establishing a General Duty of Precaution in Environmental Pro-
tection Policies in the United Stales, in IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, su-
pra note 1, at xxi, xxv ("The Precautionary Principle offers the practicality that a gen-
eral principle of environmental protection lacks .... [T]he precautionary approach
creates an obligation to consider competing options and to act cautiously whenever
possible. This is the responsibility that is currently missing ... throughout U.S. envi-
ronmental policy.").
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who think that the precautionary principle calls for stringent regula-
tion of greenhouse gases; such people neglect the need to adopt pre-
cautions against the very risks introduced by stringent regulation. In
the same vein, those who invoke the precautionary principle to seek
regulation of human cloning neglect the possibility that, without
therapeutic cloning, many people will die.
14
9
But these points simply raise an additional question: Why is the
precautionary principle so influential? Why does it speak to so many
people? I believe that much of the answer lies in an understanding of
behavioral economics and cognitive psychology. Five points are espe-
cially pertinent. Taken together, they help explain the kinds of blind-
ers that people wear when they use the precautionary principle to
support concrete outcomes. The points help show the sense in which
the relevant blinders are not arbitrary or coincidental. They have
some unmistakable structure.
A. Loss Aversion and Familiarity
People tend to be loss averse, which means that a loss from the
status quo is seen as more undesirable than a gain is seen as desir-
able.150 To see how loss aversion works, consider some of the classic
experiments, which involve the endowment effect."' People who were
initially endowed with certain goods-such as coffee mugs, chocolate
bars, and binoculars-valued those goods far more than those who
were not initially endowed with them. The reason for the endowment
effect is loss aversion: people are much more distressed by the pros-
152pect of loss than they are pleased by the prospect of equivalent gain.
Another way to put the point is to say that contrary to economic the-
149 See Statement of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, supra note 40 (arguing in favor of fol-
lowing the precautionary principle with respect to human cloning).
See Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 588, 665-70 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995)
(discussing the endowment effect, which arises from loss aversion and creates gaps be-
tween the prices at which a person is willing to buy and sell an identical object); Daniel
Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J.
POL. ECON. 1325, 1327-28 (1990) (discussing the asymmetry created by loss aversion
whereby owners will evaluate goods at a higher price than will buyers); Richard Thaler,
The Psychology of Choice and the Assumptions of Economics, in LABORATORY
EXPERIMENTATION IN ECONOMICS 99, 105 (Alvin E. Roth ed., 1987) (arguing that
"losses loom larger than gains"), reprinted in THALER, supra note 126, at 137, 143.
151 See Kahneman et al., supra note 150, at 132942 (discussing several of these ex-
periments).
152 Of course, loss aversion itself remains to be explained. For a relevant discus-
sion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 106 (2002).
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ory, people do not value out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs the
same. Opportunity costs, as forgone gains, seem to be far less bad, on
a per-dollar basis, than out-of-pocket costs.
In the context of risk regulation, there is a clear implication:
people will be closely attuned to the losses produced by any newly in-
troduced risk, or any aggravation of existing risks, but far less con-
cerned with the benefits that are forgone as a result of regulation. I
believe that loss aversion helps to explain what makes the precaution-
ary principle operational: the opportunity costs of regulation often
register little or not at all, whereas the out-of-pocket costs of the activ-
ity or substance in question are entirely visible. In fact, this is a form
of status quo bias.' 3 The status quo marks the baseline against which
gains and losses are measured, and a loss from the status quo seems
much more bad than a gain from the status quo seems good.
If loss aversion is at work, we would predict that the precautionary
principle would place a spotlight on the losses introduced by some
risk and downplay the benefits forgone as a result of controls. In fact,
this is what we have observed in several contexts. In the context of
genetic engineering of food, this is very much the situation.5  When-
ever the "opportunity benefits" are off-screen, this will be the reason
that the precautionary principle appears to give guidance notwith-
standing the objections I have made. At the same time, the neglected
opportunity benefits present a devastating problem with the use of the
precautionary principle. We can find this problem when the precau-
tionary principle is invoked to support bans on nonreproductive clon-
ing.155 For many people, the possible harms of cloning register more
strongly than the potential therapeutic benefits that would be elimi-
nated by a ban on the practice.
Loss aversion is closely associated with another cognitive finding:
people are far more willing to tolerate familiar risks than unfamiliar ones, even
153 See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Mak-
ing, I J. RISK & UNCERTAINIY 7, 45-46 (1988) (arguing that the status quo persists in
part because "potentially compensable changes have no moral standing").
154 See Katherine Barrett & Gabriela Flora, Genetic Engineering and the Precautionary
Principle, GERMINATOR (N. Plains Sustainable Agric. Soc'y, Fullerton, N.D.), Mar. 2000
(explaining that the precautionary principle still applies even though genetically al-
tered foods have already been planted around the globe), http://www.npsas.org/
GEPrecautionary.html.
155 See, e.g., Statement of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, sufnra note 40 (applying the pre-
cautionary principle to cloning).
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if they are statistically equivalent.'56 The risks associated with driving do
not occasion a great deal of concern, even though tens of thousands
of people die from motor vehicle accidents each year. The relevant
risks are simply seen as part of life. By contrast, many people are quite
concerned about risks that appear newer, such as the risks associated
with genetically modified foods, recently introduced chemicals, nu-
clear power plants, and terrorism. Part of the reason for the asymme-
try may be a belief that, with new risks, we are in the domain of uncer-
tainty rather than risk, and hence it makes sense to be cautious when
probabilities cannot be assigned. But the individual and social pro-
pensity to focus on new risks outruns that sensible propensity; it makes
the precautionary principle operational by emphasizing a subset of
the hazards actually involved.
B. The Mythical Benevolence of Nature
Sometimes the precautionary principle operates by incorporating
the belief that nature is essentially benign and that human interven-
tion is likely to carry risks-as in the suggestion that the precautionary
principle calls for stringent regulation of pesticides. This is a distinc-
tive form of loss aversion. The idea is that any human intervention
will create loss from the status quo, and that this loss should carry
great weight, whereas the gains should be regarded with some suspi-
cion or at least be taken as less weighty. Often loss aversion and a be-
lief in nature's benevolence march hand-in-hand: nature's status quo
forms the baseline or reference state against which to assess devia-
tions. Processes that interfere with nature seem, on the part of many,
to be taken as troubling "degradation"-whereas gains or improve-
ments seem, other things being equal, far less significant.
A belief in the benevolence of nature does play a role in the op-
eration of the precautionary principle, especially among those who
see nature as harmonious or in balance. In fact, many of those who
156 See Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in SOCIETAL
RISK ASSESSMENT: HOW SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 181, 200-03 (Richard C. Schwing &
Walter A. Albers, Jr., eds., 1980) (summarizing study results statistically proving this
point). Note also that people have been found to show less concern for risks that seem
voluntary and controllable, see Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe Is Safe Enough? A Psy-
chometric Study of Attitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 9 POL'Y SCI. 127, 143
(1978) (' [For any given level of benefit, greater risk was tolerated if that risk was vol-
untary, immediate, known precisely, controllable and familiar."), reprinted in SLOVIC,
supra note 24, at 80, 94, and the risks from driving might so appear. On some relevant
complexities in risk perception, suggesting that there is no simple dichotomy between
voluntary and involuntary risks, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 45, at 67-72.
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endorse the principle seem to be especially concerned about new
technologies. Certainly most people believe that natural chemicals
are more safe than manmade chemicals.5 7  (Most toxicologists dis-
agree.) 151, On this view, the principle calls for caution when people are
intervening into the natural world. Here of course we can find some
sense: Nature often consists of systems, and interventions into systems
can cause a number of problems. New technologies may produce un-
intended bad effects, if only because they interfere with systems. But
there is a large problem with this understanding of the precautionary
principle. What is natural may not be safe at all.
1'59
Consider, for example, the idea that there is a "balance of nature."
According to one account, this idea is not true. 60 A scientific "revolu-
tion" has shown that nature "is characterized by change, not con-
stancy,"'16 1 and that "natural ecological systems are dynamic," with de-
sirable changes including "those induced through human action. ' 2
In any case, nature is often a realm of destruction, illness, killing, and
death.'" Hence the claim cannot be that human activity is necessarily
or systematically more destructive than nature. Nor is it clear that
natural products are comparatively safe.16 1 Organic foods, favored by
157 See Nancy Kraus et al., Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical
Risks, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 215, 220 (1992) (verifying the "commonly held belief that the
public has much more confidence in the safety of natural (as opposed to synthetic)
chemicals than do the experts"), reprinted in SLOVIC, supra note 24, at 285, 295.
158 See id. at 221 (stating that eighty-five percent of surveyed toxicologists disagreed
with the statement, "Natural chemicals, as a rule, are not as harmful as man-made
chemicals").
159 See COLLMAN, supra note 22, at 1-2, 155-57 (discussing popular underestimation
of the true risks of natural toxins); see also Paul Rozin, Technological Stigma: Some Perspec-
tives from the Study of Contagion, in RISK, MEDIA AND STIGMA: UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC
CHALLENGES TO MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 31, 38 Uames Flynn et al. eds.,
2001) (urging that "more lives are lost to natural than to man-made disasters" but re-
ferring to evidence of "lay overestimation of carcinogenic risk from pesticides, and un-
derestimation of the risks from natural carcinogens").
160 See Daniel P. Botkin, Adjusting Law to Nature's Discordant Harmonies, 7 DUKE
ENVrL. L. & POL'Y F. 25, 27 (1996) (asserting that the "myth" of the "balance of na-
ture" has been "demonstrated as part of the revolution in environmental sciences").
16 Id.
162 I. at 31.
163 For a detailed elaboration on this point, describing the violent indignities vis-
ited upon the human race by nature, see JOHN STUART MILL, Nature, in THREE ESSAYS
ON RELIGION 3, 28-31 (AMS Press 1970) (1874).
164 See COLLMAN, supra note 22, at 7-37 (discussing the harmful potential of com-
mon foods, including breads and cereals, spices, and organic produce). Perhaps the
public is more comfortable with gradual changes than with large deviations, though
this speculation has not, to my knowledge, been tested. Natural processes might seem
more benign because they have their own rhythms, with which human interventions
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many people on grounds of safety and health and creating annual
revenues of $4.5 billion in the United States alone, have been said to
be "actually riskier to consume than food grown with synthetic chemi-
cals. ""' If the precautionary principle is seen to raise doubts about
pesticides, but not about organic foods, it is probably because the
health risks that come with significant departures from "nature" regis-
ter as especially troublesome.
Of course, some of the most serious risks are a product of nature.
Tobacco smoking kills 400,000 Americans each year; the precaution-
ary principle might be (but has not been) directed against it. Nothing
is more natural than exposure to sunlight, but such exposure is asso-
ciated with skin cancer and other harms, 166 producing serious health
problems that have not always been the occasion for invoking the pre-
cautionary principle. Studies suggest that of deaths attributable to
ionizing radiation, the vast majority come from natural rather than
man-made sources, with only twenty-five out of 1265 annual cancer
deaths in England from such radiation coming from human
sources. 67 To say this is not to resolve specific issues, which depend
on complex questions of value and fact. My only suggestion is that the
false belief in a benevolence of nature helps to explain why the pre-
may or may not fit, depending on their abruptness. To a generalist, it certainly seems
reasonable to urge a kind of "abruptness heuristic," in accordance with which rapid,
large-scale changes seem particularly dangerous. The problem is that many man-made
interventions create slow, incremental changes, while nature sometimes creates rapid,
large-scale ones (e.g., earthquakes and floods). Even if the abruptness heuristic with-
stands scrutiny, it cannot distinguish between natural processes and man-made ones.
165 Id. at 31. To be sure, this account is controversial. Collnan's conclusions were
based on research conducted by Dennis Avery of the Hudson Institute, Center for
Global Food Issues, and Avery's methods and conclusions have recently been subjected
to significant criticism. See, e.g., Marian Burros, Anti-Organic, and Flawed, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 1999, at F5 (challenging Avery's argument that "organic" chickens bring a
higher risk of salmonella, since it relied on a study finding heightened salmonella lev-
els in "premium" chickens, which were not "organic" birds); Nancy Creamer, CDC Has
Never Compared E. Coli Risks of Organic, Traditional Food, VEG-I-NEWS (N.C. State Univ.,
Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 1999, at http://ipmwww.ncsu.edu/vegetables/veginews/
veginw14.htm ("Contrary to a well-circulated article written by Dennis T. Avery, the
[CDC] has never conducted a study that compares the risk of contracting E. coli bacte-
ria in both conventional and organically grown food."). For Avery's response to these
criticisms, see Wallace Institute Got It Wrong.. CDC Data DOES Indicate Higher Risk from
Organic and Natural Foods, Ctr. for Global Food Issues, Hudson Inst. (Feb. 27, 1999), at
http://www.cgfi.org/materials/articles/1999/feb_27_99.htm. In any case, organic
foods might be urged on grounds that do not involve human health; perhaps organic
farming is less destructive to wildlife and to the environment.
166 COLLMAN, supra note 22, at 199-201; see Tubiana, supra note 106, at 12 ("Sun
exposure is particularly dangerous for infants and children.").
67 Tubiana, supra note 106, at 10.
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cautionary principle is thought, quite incorrectly, to provide a great
deal of analytical help.
C. The Availability Heuristic
It is well established that in thinking about risks, people rely on
certain heuristics, or rules of thumb, which serve to simplify their in-
quiry. 16 Of these rules of thumb, the availability heuristic is most im-
portant for purposes of understanding the law relating to risks. 1 6" The
availability heuristic also helps illuminate the operation of the precau-
tionary principle, by showing why some hazards will be on-screen and
why others will be neglected. For example, "a class whose instances
are easily retrieved will appear more numerous than a class of equal
frequency whose instances are less retrievable."' Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman demonstrate the point with a simple study showing
people a list of well-known individuals of both sexes, and asking them
whether the list contains more names of women or men. In lists in
which the men were especially famous, people thought that the list
had more names of men, whereas in lists in which the women were
the more famous, people thought that the list had more names of
171
women.
This is a point about how familiarity can affect the availability of in-
stances. A risk that is familiar, like the risk associated with nuclear
power, will be seen as more likely than a risk that is less familiar, like
the risk associated with heat during the summer. 72 But salience is im-
168 See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINlY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra
note 23 (discussing the rule of heuristics).
169 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 23, at 1127-28 (discussing the predictable
biases generated by the availability heuristic).
170 Id. at 1127.
171 Id.
172 See generally KLINENBERG, supra note 25 (describing the 1995 Chicago heat wave
that killed over five hundred people). The availability heuristic might seem in tension
with the finding, mentioned above, that familiar risks usually occasion less concern
than new and unfamiliar ones. Supra text accompanying note 156. But there is no
tension. When a risk is familiar in the sense that people can easily think of examples
of its occurrence, the estimated probability will be relatively high. This point is not
inconsistent with the suggestion that when a risk is new and unfamiliar, people will be
especially concerned about it. People often most fear risks that are new and unfamiliar
but cognitively accessible: consider the extreme reactions of people in the Washing-
ton, D.C., area to the sniper shootings in the fall of 2002. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's
Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming
Apr. 2003) (manuscript at 2, on file with author) (providing examples of public reac-
tions to the sniper shootings). Of course it is possible that when a risk appears famil-
iar, people will estimate it as relatively high but also show relatively little concern with
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portant as well. "For example, the impact of seeing a house burning
on the subjective probability of such accidents is probably greater than
the impact of reading about a fire in the local paper. ,113 So too, re-
cent events will have a greater impact than earlier ones. The point
helps explain much risk-related behavior, including decisions to take
precautions. For example, whether people will buy insurance for
natural disasters is greatly affected by recent experiences.1 7 4 If floods
have not occurred in the immediate past, people who live on flood
plains are far less likely to purchase insurance.175 In the aftermath of
an earthquake, insurance for earthquakes rises sharply-but it de-
clines steadily from that point, as vivid memories recede. 76 Note that
the use of the availability heuristic, in these contexts, is hardly irra-
tional. Both insurance and precautionary measures can be expen-
sive, and what has happened before seems, much of the time, to be
that risk-as appears to be the case with driving. These points are best understood by
considering the fact that Tversky and Kahneman emphasize familiarity as a way of ex-
ploring estimates of probability, see Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 23, at 1127 (explain-
ing that familiarity affects the retrievabilit,, of instances, which leads to predictable bi-
ases in estimates of probability), whereas Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah
Lichtenstein emphasize familiarity as one of the qualitative factors that ordinary people
care about when responding to risks, see Slovic et al., supra note 156, at 199 (grouping
familiarity with observability, knowledge, and immediacy of risk as a family of qualita-
tive factors affecting risk assessment).
173 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 23, at 1127.
174 See Howard Kunreuther, Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection, 24 PUB.
POL'Y 227, 250 (1976) ("[A]ny factor which makes the losses from a hazard highly
memorable or imaginable-such as a recent disaster or a vivid film-can considerably
increase the perceived risk of the event and hence increase the individual's awareness
of its consequences.").
175 Id. at 248-49.
176 Paul Slovic et al., Decision Processes, Rationality, and Adjustment to Natural Hazards,
in NATURAL HAZARDS: LOCAL, NATIONAL, GLOBAL 187, 194 (Gilbert F. White ed.,
1974), reprinted in SLOVIC, supra note 24, at 1, 14.
177 Kahneman and Tversky emphasize that the heuristics they identify "are highly
economical and usually effective," but also that they "lead to systematic and predictable
errors." Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 23, at 1131. Gerd Gigerenzer, among oth-
ers, has emphasized that some heuristics can work extremely well. See, e.g., GERD
GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL WORLD (2000) (applying
heuristics of discovery); Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics:
The Adaptive Toolbox, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 3, 14 (Gerd Gigeren-
zer et al. eds., 1999) (explaining that heuristics can be used to solve problems through
objects or options). He uses this point as a rejoinder to those who stress the errors in-
troduced by heuristics and biases. For a helpful recent discussion, see Daniel Kahne-
man & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive
Judgnent, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVEJUDGMENT, supra
note 127, at 49. 1 do not mean to take a stand on the resulting debates. Even if many
heuristics mostly work well in daily life, a sensible government can do much better
than to rely on them.
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the best available guide to what will happen again. The problem is
that the availability heuristic can lead to serious errors, in terms of
both excessive fear and neglect.
The availability heuristic helps to explain the operation of the
precautionary principle for a simple reason. Sometimes a certain risk,
said to call for precautions, is cognitively available, whereas other
risks, including the risks associated with regulation itself, are not. For
example, it is easy to see that arsenic is potentially dangerous; arsenic
is well known as a poison, forming the first word of a well-known
movie about poisoning. By contrast, there is a relatively complex
mental operation in the judgment that stringent nuclear power regu-
lation might lead people to use less safe alternatives. In many cases
where the precautionary principle seems to offer guidance, the reason
is that some of the relevant risks are available while others are barely
visible.
It is well known that the availability heuristic affects risk judg-
ments, and we can now appreciate the relationship between that heu-
ristic and the operation of the precautionary principle. But to say the
least, the availability heuristic does not operate in a social vacuum.79
What is readily "available" to some individuals, groups, cultures, and
even nations will not be available to all. For example, the risk of nu-
clear accidents is not so "available" to the French, since that country
has not experienced serious health risks from nuclear power even
though the country relies heavily on that technology. The lack of sali-
ency partly explains why there has not been a strong movement in
France to ban nuclear power.1s° By contrast, the Three Mile Island in-
cident provoked intense concerns about nuclear power plants in the
178 ARSENIC AND OLD LACE (Warner Bros. 1944).
179 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 685 (1999) (arguing that the availability heuristic "interacts with
identifiable social mechanisms to generate availability cascades.., through which ex-
pressed perceptions trigger chains of individual responses that make these perceptions
appear increasingly plausible through their rising availability in public discourse");
Dan Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-
Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2003) (manuscript at 23-24, on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (characterizing the availability
heuristic as "relatively weak" in explaining attitudes toward gun control because it fails
to consider cultural orientations and, as such, does not explain why the offensive or
defensive use of guns "is more 'available' to particular individuals").
180 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 179, at 745 (comparing the "popularity and
widespread reliance on nuclear power in France [with] its unpopularity and sharply
limited use in the United States").
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United States 18 and helped promote the widespread idea that a pre-
cautionary approach was sensible in order to discourage reliance on
nuclear power. Many of those who favor gun control legislation have
"available" a set of incidents in which such legislation would have
avoided unnecessary deaths; many of those who reject such legislation
are alert to incidents in which private gun ownership allowed people
to fend off criminal violence.'82 Much remains to be done to clarify
the relationship between the availability heuristic and social interac-
tions, including the operations of the media and political officials.
For present purposes, the key point is that the availability heuristic of-
ten underwrites the use of the precautionary principle, by suggesting
the importance of taking precautions against some, but hardly all, of
the risks involved.
D. Probability Neglect
The availability heuristic can produce an inaccurate assessment of
probability. But sometimes people will attempt little assessment of
probability at all, especially when strong emotions are involved.' In
such cases, large-scale variations in probabilities will matter little-
even when those variations unquestionably should matter. The point
applies to hope as well as fear; vivid images of good outcomes will
crowd out consideration of probability too.184 Lotteries are successful
partly for this reason."' But for purposes of applying the
precautionary principle, the topic is fear rather than hope. I suggest
that sometimes the precautionary principle becomes workable
because the issue of probability is neglected and people focus on one
emotionally gripping outcome among a large set of possibilities.
Probability neglect has received its clearest empirical confirmation
in a striking study of people's willingness to pay to avoid electric
191 See id. at 687-88 (noting that environmental organizations gained public sup-
port for tighter regulations after the Three Mile Island incident).
182 See Kahan & Braman, supra note 179 (manuscript at 9) ("Control advocates
emphasize the risk that insufficient regulation will make citizens vulnerable to deliber-
ate or accidental shootings .... ).183
See Rottenstreich & Hsee, sufa note 26, at 186-88 (determining that the
weights of small probabilities are higher for affect-rich than affect-poor outcomes).
184 See id. (finding that the weights of small probabilities of affect-rich outcomes
like winning a trip to Paris or the opportunity to kiss a movie star are greater than their
cash values).
185 See PHILLIP COOK, SELLING HOPE 71 (1993) (explaining that lottery players do
not approach objective odds in the same way that statisticians do).
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shocks.1 6 The central purpose of the study was to test the relevance of
probability in "affect-rich" decisions. One experiment investigated
whether varying the probability of harm would matter more, or less, in
settings that trigger strong emotions than in settings that seem rela-
tively emotion free. In the "strong emotion" setting, participants were
asked to imagine that they would participate in an experiment involv-
ing some chance of a "short, painful, but not dangerous electric
shock. 187 In the relatively emotion-free setting, participants were told
that the experiment entailed some chance of a $20 penalty.8 ' Partici-
pants were asked to state how much they would be willing to pay to
avoid participating in the relevant experiment. Some participants
were told that there was a 1% chance of receiving the bad outcome
(either the $20 loss or the electric shock); others were told that the
chance was 99%; and still others were told that the chance was
100%. 189
The key result was that variations in probability affected those fac-
ing the relatively emotion-free injury, the $20 penalty, far more than
they affected people facing the more emotionally evocative outcome
of an electric shock.' 90 For the cash penalty, the difference between
the median payment for a 1% chance and the median payment for a
99% chance was predictably large and indeed consistent with the
standard model: $1 to avoid a 1% chance, and $18 to avoid a 99%
chance.' 9' For the electric shock, by contrast, the difference in prob-
ability made little difference to median willingness to pay: $7 to avoid
a 1% chance, and $10 to avoid a 99% chance! 192 Apparently people
will pay a significant amount to avoid a small probability of a hazard
that is affectively laden-and the amount that they will pay will not
vary greatly with changes in probability. This point explains "why so-
cietal concerns about hazards such as nuclear power and exposure to
extremely small amounts of toxic chemicals fail to recede in response
to information about the very small probabilities of the feared conse-
quences from such hazards.' 9-"
186 Rottenstreich & Hsee, supra note 26, at 185-90.
187 Id. at 188.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 1(.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 127, at 397, 409.
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It should be easy to understand the connection between probabil-
ity neglect and the precautionary principle. If probabilities are ne-
glected, especially when emotions are engaged, then the principle will
operate through excessive public concern with certain low-probability
hazards. Return to the contrast between deaths from heat waves and
deaths from airplane crashes. The latter trigger far more intense pub-
lic attention, in part because of the availability heuristic, but in part
because for some people the outcome itself has such salience and the
probability much less so. In the context of genetic modification of
food and global warming, the same phenomenon is at work, leading
people to think that the precautionary principle, simply applied, calls
for aggressive regulatory controls. Note that I am not urging that such
controls are a mistake; in the context of global warming, they seem to
be warranted by the facts. My claim is only that the precautionary
principle appears to give guidance in part because the issue of prob-
ability is neglected.
For purposes of understanding the operation of the precautionary
principle, it is important to see that visualization, or imagery, matters
a great deal to people's reactions to risks."194 When an image of a bad
outcome is easily accessible, people will become greatly concerned
about a risk, holding probability constant. 95 Consider the fact that
when people are asked how much they will pay for flight insurance for
losses resulting from "terrorism," their responses indicate they will pay
more than if they are asked how much they will pay for flight insur-
ance from all causes. '96 The evident explanation for this peculiar re-
sult is that the word "terrorism" evokes vivid images of disaster, thus
crowding out probability judgments. Note also that when people dis-
cuss a low-probability risk, their concern rises even if the discussion
consists mostly of apparently trustworthy assurances that the likeli-
194 See Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects
of Using Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus Frequency For-
mats, 24 LAw & HUM. BEiiAv. 271, 289-94 (2000) (discussing the experimental effect
on risk judgments and information format).
195 See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYcHOL. BULL. 267, 275-
76 (2001) (noting the effects of vividness on emotional responses to risk and stating
that "people tend to be underinsured against hazards that evoke relatively pallid men-
tal images").
See EricJ. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 40-42 (1993) (describing test results that reflect bias in fa-
vor of "terrorism" coverage over total coverage, even where total coverage included
insurance against terrorist acts).
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hood of harm really is infinitesimal. The reason is that the discus-
sion makes it easier to visualize the risk and hence to fear it.
An experiment of my own, involving people's willingness to pay
for reductions in arsenic in drinking water,'0 points in the same direc-
tion. When cancer deaths from arsenic were described in emotionally
gripping terms, people's willingness to pay for reductions substantially
increased."9 More directly to the point, a substantial variation in the
probability of death (from one in one million to one in 100,000) had
more effect on willingness to pay in the unemotional condition than
in the emotional condition. 0° The basic finding, then, is that when
the bad outcome is emotionally gripping, people are more likely to
neglect differences in probability than when the bad outcome is emo-
tionally neutral.
Probability neglect does not involve the availability heuristic. That
heuristic does not lead people to neglect probability but to answer the
question of probability by substituting a hard question (what is the sta-
tistical risk?) with an easy question (do salient examples readily come
201to mind?). My point here is not that visualization makes an event
seem more probable (though this is also true), but that visualization
makes the issue of probability less relevant or even irrelevant. In the-
ory, the distinction between use of the availability heuristic and prob-
ability neglect should not be obscure. In practice, of course, it will of-
ten be hard to know whether the availability heuristic or probability
neglect is driving behavior.
The most sensible conclusion is that, with respect to risks of harm,
vivid images and concrete pictures of disaster can "crowd out" other
kinds of thoughts, including the crucial thought that the probability
of disaster is really small. "If someone is predisposed to be worried,
degrees of unlikeliness seem to provide no comfort, unless one can
197 See All Siddiq Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse Relation-
ship Between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1085, 1095 (1994) (stat-
ing that "[a] person's general affective evaluation of the item was the major predictor
of risk/benefit correlation" and that "[s]ome items showed strong negative [evalua-
tions] but relatively low [risk]").
108 Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and the Law, 112 YALE
L.J. 61, 77-80 (2002).
199 Id. at 78-79.
200 Id. at 79.
201 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Fre-
quency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 227-30 (1973) (urging that people
make risk assessments by trying to remember if something has occurred in the past and
assigning the probability based on the difficulty of recall).
20031 1047
1048 UNIVERSITY OF PIENNSYLVANIA LAWRE VIEW [Vol. 151:1003
prove that harm is absolutely impossible, which itself is not possi-
ble." O2 Probability neglect, I suggest, often makes the precautionary
principle seem sensible and workable. Indeed, the precautionary
principle often embodies a form of probability neglect. When people
focus on highly speculative risks associated with certain risks, it is often
because of intense emotional reactions that make those risks, and not
relevant others, stand out from the background. In many cases, prob-
ability neglect and loss aversion march hand-in-hand. Potential losses
from the status quo often trigger intense emotions, whereas potential
gains do not; and when the precautionary principle is operating, the
low-probability losses have far more salience than they deserve.
Nor is the problem of probability neglect foreign to law. In many
contexts, law seems to be a response, in part, to fear of bad outcomes
without close attention to the question of probability-along one di-
mension, the precautionary principle in action.! Reconsider the
European Community's ban on meat products treated with hormones,
which has raised large-scale issues about the role of public fears in risk
105regulation. The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) ruled that the ban ran afoul of Article 5.1 of the Agreement
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, ' which requires members of
the WTO to justify all health and safety regulations by reference to
scientific risk assessments. 2 0 7 In this way, the Appellate Body rejected
the European Community's effort to defend itself by pointing to con-
J20JOHN WEINGART, WASTE IS A TERRIBLE THING TO MIND: RISK, RADIATION, AND
DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 362 (2001).
2 03 With respect to global warming, this is the suggestion in GOKIANY, supra note 3,
at 57-88; LOMBORG, supra note 67, at 258-326.
204 See Sunstein, supra note 198, at 87-90 (describing how OSHA and EPA have
failed on occasion to consider probability of harm).
205 For an illuminating discussion concerning the role of regulators in responding
to public fears that are disproportionate to the risks, see Howard F. Chang, Risk Regu-
lation, Public Concerns, and the Hormones Dispute: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself?
(Feb. 18, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
206 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones): Report of the
Appellate Body, Jan. 16, 1998, No. 98-0099, para. 208, available at http://www.wto.org.
207 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr.
15, 1994, art. 5.1, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) ("Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are
based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human,
animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques devel-
oped by the relevant international organizations.").
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208"
sumer fears about the safety of beef treated with hormones. In this
context, such fears were apparently real, but they neglected the issue
209of probability. Scientific evidence was a prerequisite for regulations.
E. System Neglect
The fifth point is, in a way, the largest. My suggestion is that,
much of the time, people neglect the systemic effect of one-shot inter-
ventions. They tend to assume that a change in a social situation will
alter the part at issue, but without altering other parts. System ne-
glect, thus understood, includes the general phenomenon of tradeoff
neglect, by which people fail to see the frequent need to weigh com-1 210
peting variables against one another. But tradeoff neglect is only
part of what is involved here. When the precautionary principle gives
guidance, and when it goes wrong, it is often because those who use it
are falling victim to system neglect.
The clearest evidence comes from the German psychologist
Dietrich D6mer, who has designed some fascinating experiments to
see whether people can reduce social risks.2 1  D6rner's experiments
are run via computer. Participants are asked to reduce risks faced by
the inhabitants of some region of the world. The risks may involve
pollution, poverty, poor medical care, inadequate fertilization of
crops, sick cattle, insufficient water, or excessive hunting and fishing.
Through the magic of the computer, many policy initiatives are avail-
able (e.g., improved care of cattle, childhood immunization, and drill-
ing more wells). Participants are able to choose among them. Once
208 See Michele D. Carter, Selling Science Under the SPS Agreement: Accommodating
Consumer Preference in the Growth Hormones Controversy, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 625,
627 (1997) ("In citing consumer anxiety over the safety of beef treated with hormones,
the European Community implicitly equated consumer fears over hormone safety with
actual public health needs." (footnote omitted)).209
For a discussion of the complex normative issues, see Chang, supra note 205.
210 See MARGOLIS, supra note 30, at 2 (discussing tradeoff neglect). In fact it would
be possible to see many people as suffering from gain neglect, because they downplay
the potential gains associated with certain activities or usage. If opportunity costs are
valued less than out-of-pocket costs, gain neglect might be part of the reason. The
same might be said of those who emphasize the risks associated with genetic modifica-
tion of food, but downplay the "opportunity benefits" forgone as a result of regulation.
Gain neglect is of course another way of describing loss aversion, discussed supra Part
III.A. I suggest that the well-understood idea of loss aversion is actually an exercise in
framing, and that "gain neglect" might be an equally apt, or even more apt, descrip-
tion of what has been found.
211 D6RNER, supra note 28.
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particular initiatives are chosen, the computer projects, over short pe-
riods and then over decades, what is likely to happen in the region.
In these experiments, success is entirely possible. Some initiatives
will actually make for effective and enduring improvements. But
many of the participants-even the most educated and professional-
produce calamities. They do so because they fixate on isolated prob-
lems and do not see the complex, system-wide effects of particular in-
terventions. For example, they may appreciate the importance of in-
creasing the number of cattle, but once they do that, they create a
serious risk of overgrazing, which they failed to anticipate. They
may appreciate the value of drilling more wells to provide water, but
they do not anticipate the energy and environmental effects of the
drilling, which then endangers the food supply. Only the rare par-
ticipant is able to see a number of steps down the road-to under-
stand the multiple effects of one-shot interventions into the system
and to assess a wide range of consequences from those interventions.
The successful participants seem to take small, reversible steps, or to
see the full set of effects at once, and thus to protect themselves
against major blunders. When people are not successful, it is because
they fail to see that risks are parts of systems.
21
How would the precautionary principle operate if invoked in
D6rner's experiments? It should be easy to see that while the weaker
versions might provide some assistance, the stronger versions offer no
help at all. There are simply too many risks against which one might
take precautions. Precautions cannot be taken against all risks, not
for the important but less interesting reason that resources are lim-
ited, but simply because efforts to redress any set of risks might pro-
duce risks of their own. The real world of risk regulation offers many
214analogues. To the extent that the precautionary principle appears
to offer guidance, it is often because adverse systemic effects, and the
need to take precautions against them, are simply being neglected.
Howard Margolis has used a related point to explain why experts
have different risk judgments from ordinary people, and he has done
2 See id. at 5-10 (arguing that human beings' tendencies to deal with problems on
an "ad hoc basis" fail to account for the risk inherent in any complex system and con-
sidering various explanations for that incapacity).
213 -For some real-world analogues to Dorner's experiments, see JAMES C. ScoTr,
SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION
HAVE FAILED (1998).
24 See Wiener, supra note 3, at 1521-26 (discussing the multirisk nature of social
situations).
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so in a particular effort to explain why and when ordinary people will
think, "better safe than sorry.",2 5 Margolis thus offers some cognitive
foundations for the precautionary principle without explicitly discuss-
ing the idea. Margolis's goal is to cast light on some apparent anoma-
lies in ordinary thinking about risks: Why do people believe that small
risks from pesticides should be regulated, if comparatively small risks
from X-rays are quite tolerable? Why are people so concerned about
the risks of nuclear power, when experts tend to believe that the risks
are quite low-lower, in fact, than the risks from competing energy
sources, such as coal-fired power plants, which produce less public ob-
jection?
Margolis suggests that people are sometimes subject to a kind of
optical illusion, in which they see the harms associated with some ac-
tivity or process, but fail to appreciate the benefits. If so, they will
tend to think, "better safe than sorry.""" If they perceive both, they
will see some "fungibility" between both harms and benefits and en-
217gage in the kind of tradeoff analysis that is more typical for experts.
Margolis offers a nice example to support this suggestion. 218 The re-
moval of asbestos from schools in New York City was initially quite
popular, indeed demanded by parents, even though experts believed
that the risks were statistically small. 9 (As it happens, the risk of a
child getting cancer from asbestos insulation was about one-third the
risk of being struck by lightning.) 220 But when it emerged that the re-
moval would cause schools to be closed for a period of weeks, and
when the closing caused parents to become greatly inconvenienced,
parental attitudes turned right around, and asbestos removal seemed
221like a really bad idea. When the costs of the removal came on-
screen, parents thought much more like experts, and the risks of as-
bestos seemed well worth tolerating: statistically small, and on balance
worth incurring. The precautionary principle often operates because
215 See MARGOLIS, supra note 30, at 75 (explaining that the risk matrix is an at-
tempt to provide an account of why some people are blind to a "waste not, want not"
position, while fully embracing the polar-opposite state of "better safe than sorry").
216 See id. at 75-81 (explaining the "better safe than sorry" and "waste not" positions
in terms of the risk matrix).
217 See id. at 75-92 (describing the differences in expert and lay assessments of risk
in terms of the risk matrix).
218 See id. at 124-28 (setting forth the facts of the 1993 New York City school asbes-
tos closings).
219 Id. at 124.
220 Tony Snow, End thePhony "Asbestos Panic, "USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 1993, at llA.
MARGOLIS, supra note 30, at 124-25.
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of the visibility of only one side of the ledger, just as parents, in ad-
vance of asbestos removal, see the possibility of the hazard without
confronting the problems introduced by reducing it.
For an especially vivid example, consider the apparent views of
Americans in the late 1990s. About sixty-three percent of Americans
agreed with the statement, "Protecting the environment is so impor-
tant that requirements and standards cannot be too high and continu-
ing environmental improvements-must be made regardless of cost.
'22
In the same general vein, fifty-nine percent supported the Kyoto
22-Treaty on global warming, with only twenty-one percent opposed. "
But in the same period, fifty-two percent of Americans said they would
refuse to support the Kyoto Treaty if "it would cost an extra $50 a
month for an average American household. '2 4 In fact, only eleven
percent of Americans would support the Kyoto Treaty if the monthly
expense were $100 or more.2 5 How can we explain strong majority
support for "environmental improvements... regardless of cost" and
strong majority rejection of environmental improvements when the
cost is high? The answer lies in the fact that people are not, in fact,
willing to spend an infinite amount for environmental improvements,
and that unless the costs are squarely placed "on-screen," people's
weighing might be insufficiently reflective.
There are many other examples. People seem quite concerned
about the risks associated with dioxin, a real candidate for use of the
precautionary principle, but far less concerned about the statistically
equivalent risks associated with aflatoxin, a carcinogen found in pea-
227nut butter. When aflatoxin does not trigger public concern, a large
part of the reason is that the burdens of banning aflatoxin seem high
and indeed intolerable; too many people would object to heavy regu-
lation of peanut butter, for generations a staple of school lunches and
many diets. In this light, it is both mildly counterintuitive and reason-
able, for example, to predict that people would be willing to pay less,
in terms of dollars and waiting time, to reduce low-probability risks of
222 Americans on the Global Warming Treaty, supra note 55, at http://www.pipa.org/
OnlineReports/GlobalWarming/glob-warmtreaty.html.
223Idl .
224 d.
225 Id.
226 I am not suggesting that such weighing should be decisive for purposes of pol-
icy. For one thing, it might not be sufficiently reflective even if tradeoffs are consid-
ered. For another, the interests of animals should count whether or not they are in-
cluded in conventional cost-benefit balancing.
227 MARGOuS, supra note 30, at 136-37.
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an airplane disaster if they are frequent travelers. An intriguing study
finds exactly that effect. It is also safe to predict that if people were
told, by a reliable source, that eliminating pesticides would lead to se-
rious health problems-for example, because pesticide-free fruits and
vegetables carried special dangers-the perceived risk of pesticides
would decline dramatically, and it would be difficult to invoke the
precautionary principle as a basis for stringent regulation of pesti-
cides. Indeed, I predict that if people were informed that eliminat-
ing pesticides would lead to a significant increase in the price of ap-
ples and oranges, the perceived risk would go down as well.3
How might ideas operate in practice? Consider an example: The
precautionary principle should not be applied, in its most aggressive
form, to the general category of "pesticides." An approach of this sort,
banning many or most pesticides, would produce substantial risks of
its own, partly because pesticides reduce some risks, partly because
some substitutes for pesticides produce risks of their own. It would be
far more sensible to adopt a precautionary approach to those pesti-
cides that appear, on the basis of existing evidence, to create a signifi-
cant risk of harm, even if that risk cannot be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt. This is the weak version of the precautionary principle,
which, I have urged, should be seen as unexceptionable. But even if
significant risks can be found, it is also important to identify the risks
associated with the substitutes for those pesticides, and to know
whether those risks are also to be controlled if they are significant. Af-
ter assessing the relevant risks, it remains to consider the economic
231costs of restrictions, as indeed existing law requires, in recognition
228 See Mathew Harrington, People's Willingness to Accept Airport Security Delays
in Exchange for Lesser Risk 6-7 (Jan. 28, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (describing how the twelve survey respondents who had experienced signifi-
cant delays were less willing to pay for additional airport security than those twenty-
four respondents who had not experienced such delays).
229 See Carolyn Raffensperger, The Precautionary Principle as Forecaring: Hopeful
Work for the Environmental Health Movement, Remarks at the Mount Alverno Con-
ference Center (Oct. 6-8, 2000) (arguing that the precautionary principle often re-
quires regulation of pesticides), available at http://www.biotech-info.net/
forecarng.html.
230 For evidence of this general phenomenon, see Melissa L. Finucane et al., The
Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13J. BEUiAv. DECISION MAKING 1, 9-13
(2000), reprinted in SLOVIC, supra note 24, at 413, 421-26.
231 See 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2000) (defining unreasonable adverse effects on the
environment to include "any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into
account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide"). Note in this regard one study's finding that a ban on certain widely used
pesticides would increase household retail food prices by only $5.90-$8.60 per year.
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of the need for a wider viewscreen than that afforded by the precau-
tionary principle.
The conclusion is that the precautionary principle often seems
helpful because analysts focus on the "target" risk and not on the sys-
temic, risk-related effects of being precautionary, or even on the risk-
related consequences of risk reduction. Rational regulators, of
course, think about systems, not snapshots.232 And once we see that
risks are inevitably part of systems, the precautionary principle will be-
come far less helpful.
IV. TOWARD WIDER VIEWSCREENS
In this Article, I have argued not that the precautionary principle
leads in the wrong directions, but that if it is taken for all that it is
worth, it leads in no direction at all. The reason is that risks of one
kind or another are on all sides of regulatory choices, and it is there-
fore impossible, in most real-world cases, to avoid running afoul of the
principle. Frequently, risk regulation creates a (speculative) risk from
substitute risks or from forgone risk-reduction opportunities. And be-
cause of the (speculative) mortality and morbidity effects of costly
regulation, any regulation, if it is costly, threatens to run afoul of the
precautionary principle. We have seen that both regulation and non-
regulation seem to be forbidden in cases involving nuclear power, ar-
senic, global warming, and genetic modification of food. The precau-
tionary principle appears to offer guidance only because people blind
RONAI) D. KNUTSON & EDWARD G. SMITH, IMPACTS OF ELIMINATING
ORGANOPHOSPHATES AND CARBAMATES FROM CROP PRODUCTION 112-13 (Agric. &
Food Policy Ctr., Policy Working Paper No. 99-2, 1999), available, at http://
www.afpc.tamu.edu/pubs/0/114/wp99-2.pdf. Of course, I do not mean to endorse
that controversial finding here.
2 There might seem to be some tension between the plea for wide viewscreens
and my (qualified) argument for a form of judicial minimalism in CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999). But there is no tension. Minimalism is a form of incre-
mentalism, arguing on behalf of "small steps" in part because of the risk that large-
scale interventions into systems will have unanticipated adverse consequences. See id.
at 53 ("Within the judiciary, minimalism is a sensible reaction to the limitations that
judges know they face, not least in predicting the consequences of their decisions.").
Indeed, D6rner himself suggests that small steps are a desirable approach to the risk of
system neglect. D6RNER, supira note 28, at 166-81; see id. at 2 ("[H]uman planning and
decision-making processes can go awry... if we apply corrective measures too aggres-
sively or too timidly .... ). By endorsing a wide viewscreen, I do not mean to chal-
lenge small steps, but instead to urge that in taking any step at all, officials should look
at the range of likely consequences. Of course it is possible that a full assessment of
such consequences will be beyond existing capacities. In such cases, simplifying de-
vices might be helpful. See GOKLANY, supra note 3, at 9-10, for some suggestions.
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themselves to certain aspects of the risk situation, focusing on a mere
subset of the hazards that are at stake.
To some extent, those who endorse the precautionary principle
are responding to salutary political or moral motivations that the
principle might be thought to embody. Well-organized private groups
sometimes demand conclusive proof of harm as a precondition for
regulation; the demand should be firmly resisted because a probability
of harm is, under many circumstances, a sufficient reason to act. Both
individuals and societies have a tendency to neglect the future; the
precautionary principle might be understood as a warning against that
form of neglect. There are extremely good reasons to incorporate
distributional considerations into risk regulation, and the precaution-
ary principle seems, some of the time, to be a way to protect the most
disadvantaged against risks of illness, accident, and death. Sometimes
people try to reduce dissonance by thinking that actual risks are triv-
ial; the precautionary principle might be a helpful counterweight to
this mechanism. The problem is that the precautionary principle, as
applied, is a crude and sometimes perverse way to promote these vari-
ous goals, not least because it might be, and has been, urged in situa-
tions in which the principle threatens to injure future generations and
to harm rather than to help those who are most disadvantaged.
I have also urged that the precautionary principle can be made
operational only because of identifiable cognitive mechanisms. Often
loss aversion is at work. The benefits of certain practices are less sali-
ent than the costs, simply because the costs would, along an important
dimension, represent a deterioration from the status quo. When loss
aversion is involved, it might be thought, wrongly, that natural proc-
esses are always safer and better for the environment than processes
that involve human intervention. Sometimes the precautionary prin-
ciple works by exploiting the availability heuristic, because the risks
that matter are cognitively accessible, whereas the risks that are ig-
nored are far less so. Frequently the precautionary principle is un-
derwritten by probability neglect. Highly speculative harms are em-
phasized by those who focus on the badness of the relevant outcomes,
rather than the likelihood that they will occur. Most generally, the
precautionary principle sometimes gives an illusion of guidance be-
cause people focus on the immediate risk while disregarding the sys-
temic effects of one-shot interventions, even though those interven-
tions can give rise to risks of their own.
I have not suggested any particular substitute for the precaution-
ary principle. But I do not endorse the suggestion of Aaron Wildav-
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sky, a political scientist with a special interest in risk regulation, who
211also rejects the precautionary principle. In Wildavsky's view, the no-
tion of "precaution" should be abandoned and replaced with a prin-
ciple of "resilience," based on an understanding that nature and soci-
ety are quite able to incorporate even strong shocks, and that the
ultimate dangers are therefore smaller than we are likely to fear.2 3 4 It
would follow from the "resilience" principle that a nation should be
less concerned than it now is with the risks associated with (for exam-
ple) arsenic, global warming, and destruction of the ozone layer. Un-
fortunately, the principle of "resilience" is no better than that of "pre-
caution." Some systems are resilient, but many are not. Whether an
ecosystem, or a society, is "resilient" cannot be decided in the abstract.
In any case, resilience is a matter of degree. Everything depends on
the facts. The "resilience principle" should be understood as a heuris-
tic, one that favors inaction in the face of possibly damaging techno-
logical change. Like most heuristics, the resilience principle will work
well in many circumstances, but it can also lead to systematic and even
211~
deadly errors.
A better approach would acknowledge that a wide variety of ad-
verse effects may come from inaction, regulation, and everything in
between. Such an approach would attempt to consider all of those
adverse effects and not simply a subset.' " When existing knowledge
does not allow clear assessments of the full range of adverse effects,
such an approach would develop simplifying devices, helping to show
the appropriate course of action in the face of uncertainty."' Such an
233 See WILDAVSKY, supra note 138, at 430-33 (criticizing the use of the precaution-
ary principle in the environmental health and safety context).
234 Id. at 433.
29,9 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 23 (illustrating how heuristics can lead to
systematic mistakes). The "resilience" principle might well be taken as a reflection of
optimistic bias. See TAYLOR, supra note 127, at 6 ("[S]ocial scientists have found that
rather than perceiving themselves, the world, and the future accurately, most people
regard themselves, their circumstances, and the future as considerably more positive
than is objectively likely or than reality can sustain."); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Op-
timism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 819 (1980)
(hypothesizing that those with unrealistic optimism "may be inclined to engage in risky
behaviors and to ignore precautions").
236 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 45, at 43-60 (describing health-health analysis, which
evaluates the benefits of a regulation against the costs of complying with it); Wiener,
supra note 3, at 1509-26 (examining precaution in a world of multiple risks).
237 See GOKLANY, supra note 3, at 9-10, for a discussion of these devices. Instead of
advocating full-fledged balancing of relevant variables, Goklany proposes that regula-
tors look at a list of criteria, including the "human mortality criterion" (valuing human
life over that of members of other species), the "immediacy criterion" (giving priority
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approach would pursue distributional goals directly by, for example,
requiring wealthy countries, major contributors to the problem of
global warming, to pay poor countries to reduce greenhouse gases or
to prepare themselves for the relevant risks. Such an approach would
attempt to counteract, rather than to embody, the various cognitive
limitations that people face in thinking about risks. An appreciation
of the difficulties with the precautionary principle suggests the impor-
tance of overcoming cognitive limitations by ensuring that people
have a full, rather than limited, sense of what is at stake. The result
should be to help with cognitive distortions and to produce sensible
priority-setting. An effort to produce a fair accounting of the universe
of dangers should also help to diminish the danger of interest-group
manipulation.
To be sure, public alarm, even if ill-informed, is itself a harm, and
it is likely to lead to additional harms, perhaps in the form of large-
scale "ripple effects. A sensible approach to risk will attempt to re-
duce public fear even if it is baseless. My goal here has been not to
deny that point, but to explain the otherwise puzzling appeal of the
precautionary principle and to isolate the strategies that help make it
operational. At the individual level, these strategies are hardly sense-
less, especially for people who lack much information or who do the
best they can by focusing on only one aspect of the situation at
hand.239 But for governments, the precautionary principle is not sen-
sible, for the simple reason that once the viewscreen is widened, it be-
comes clear that the principle provides no guidance at all. A rational
to immediate threats), the "uncertainty criterion" (giving priority to risks with a higher
probability of occurring), and "the irreversibility criterion" (giving priority to risks that
are likely to be permanent or persistent). Id. Some of these criteria seem doubtful to
me; a less immediate threat might, for example, deserve priority if its magnitude so
suggests, and it is unclear that a small number of human lives deserve priority over a
large number of lives of members of other species. But Goklany is correct to seek an
approach that helps in making decisions under uncertainty.
Wiener, supra note 3, at 1520, also offers some valuable suggestions, involving in
particular the need to ensure "risk-superior moves," meaning approaches that reduce
overall risks. As Wiener is aware, the problem with this approach is that sometimes we
will lack sufficient information to identify such moves, because regulation must pro-
ceed in the face of uncertainty rather than risk.
238 See the discussion of the social amplification of risk through ripple effects in
Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framewoork, 8 RISK
ANALYSIS 177, 183-84 (1988).
239 See Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 177, at 3-5 (urging that "fast and frugal deci-
sion-making [based on heuristics] can be as accurate as strategies that use all available
information and expensive computation").
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system of risk regulation certainly takes precautions. But it does not
adopt the precautionary principle.
